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        <title><![CDATA[Digital Gold Institute: Insights, Analysis and research]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Articles from the Digital Gold Institute on current events and the economic, regulatory and technological aspects of crypto-assets.]]></description>
        <link>https://www.dgi.io/insights/</link>
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            <title>Digital Gold Institute: Insights, Analysis and research</title>
            <link>https://www.dgi.io/insights/</link>
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        <pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2026 09:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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            <title><![CDATA[MSCI removes Strategy from its equity indexes]]></title>
            <description><![CDATA[<img src="https://www.dgi.io/news-topics/share/istituzioni-finanziarie.jpg"> Financial institutions · The index review and its implications for Bitcoin treasury models]]></description>
            <link>https://www.dgi.io/2026-11-13-msci-removes-strategy/</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dgi.io/2026-11-13-msci-removes-strategy/</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Staff]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2026 09:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <enclosure url="https://www.dgi.io/news-topics/share/istituzioni-finanziarie.jpg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On November 11, 2026, MSCI announced that Strategy would be removed from its
equity indexes, effective after the market close on November 30. The decision
follows the introduction of new criteria distinguishing operating companies from
businesses whose economic models primarily resemble financial or investment
vehicles. The review also affects other companies holding crypto-assets as a
major component of their balance sheets, including Japan’s Metaplanet. For
Strategy, the largest publicly traded corporate holder of Bitcoin, the most
immediate consequences concern passive funds tracking MSCI indexes, which will
need to adjust their portfolios. The decision also raises a broader question
about how companies that have placed Bitcoin at the center of their business
models should be classified and what that classification means for their access
to institutional capital.</p> <h2><strong>The revision of index eligibility criteria</strong></h2> <p>The decision concludes a review process that began in 2025, when MSCI started
examining the treatment of companies with significant crypto-asset holdings. The
initial proposal called for excluding companies whose digital assets represented
at least 50% of their total assets. In January 2026, however, MSCI decided not
to implement that exclusion, concluding that a broader assessment was needed for
businesses whose economic models resembled investment vehicles. A consultation
launched the following August extended the analysis to companies considered
predominantly non-operating, regardless of the nature of their holdings. On
October 15, MSCI approved the new methodology, with implementation scheduled for
the November index review.</p> <p>The new framework introduces a two-stage assessment. The first stage evaluates
whether a company has substantial operating assets relative to its overall asset
base. Companies that fail this initial screening undergo an additional
assessment based on five financial ratios reflecting their economic and balance
sheet characteristics. A company becomes ineligible for the relevant indexes if
it is flagged on at least four of the five ratios. To limit excessive turnover,
the methodology also establishes specific conditions for removing existing
constituents, requiring them to fail the eligibility screening in both of their
two most recent annual reporting periods. MSCI may also consider available
interim financial statements. The revised approach therefore replaces the
earlier criterion based exclusively on the proportion of crypto-assets held,
introducing a classification framework applicable to companies across different
industries.</p> <h2><strong>Strategy and the Bitcoin treasury business model</strong></h2> <p>Strategy is the most prominent company affected by the review. Originally
focused on enterprise software, it has progressively made Bitcoin the central
component of its treasury strategy since 2020. Its business model relies on
accumulating Bitcoin through corporate resources and capital raising activities,
including common stock offerings, debt instruments, and preferred securities.
The company has also developed a range of financial instruments targeting
investors with different risk and return preferences, using its balance sheet to
provide different forms of economic exposure. This transformation has
substantially changed its asset composition and the relative importance of its
traditional operations, making its classification particularly consequential for
index eligibility.</p> <p>Under the revised methodology, MSCI determined that Strategy was ineligible for
the relevant indexes based on criteria designed to identify companies with
characteristics similar to investment vehicles. Strategy disputes this approach,
arguing that active capital management, securities issuance, and the development
of credit products constitute genuine business activities. The company also
maintains that the new criteria introduce a distinction not recognized by
accounting standards, potentially disadvantaging innovative business models. The
disagreement therefore concerns the definition of an operating business itself:
MSCI emphasizes a company’s economic and financial characteristics to preserve
the intended representation of its indexes, while Strategy maintains that its
financial activities are entrepreneurial in nature. Its removal is consequently
not a judgment on the legitimacy of its business model, but an assessment of its
compatibility with the objectives of the relevant equity indexes.</p> <p>The review also affects other companies pursuing similar strategies, including
Metaplanet, the Japanese company that has made Bitcoin the centerpiece of its
treasury policy. However, the methodology extends to businesses in other sectors
when their economic and financial characteristics resemble those of investment
vehicles. This confirms the broader scope of the new rules, even though
companies whose activities depend heavily on accumulating and managing
crypto-assets may be particularly exposed. The determining factor is the overall
assessment of operating activities and financial structure, rather than the mere
presence of Bitcoin on the balance sheet. An industrial company holding Bitcoin
as a treasury reserve is therefore not automatically treated in the same way as
a business whose economic model primarily revolves around managing that asset.</p> <h2><strong>Implications for passive funds and capital raising</strong></h2> <p>Strategy’s removal from MSCI indexes has direct consequences for investment
vehicles tracking their composition. Index funds and physically replicated ETFs
will need to adjust their portfolios, reducing the demand associated with
products tracking the affected benchmarks. The scale of the resulting sales will
depend on existing holdings and replication methods, while actively managed
funds and vehicles tracking other indexes may continue holding Strategy shares.
Some estimates have suggested potential sales amounting to several billion
dollars, while Strategy stated that funds linked to MSCI indexes held
approximately 3.1% of its outstanding common shares, based on figures included
in its response to the consultation. However, the exclusion concerns the
company’s equity securities and does not require it to liquidate its Bitcoin
reserves, which would only be affected indirectly by any subsequent
developments.</p> <p>The more significant implications concern Strategy’s ability to raise capital, a
central component of its business model. The company uses equity offerings and
other financial instruments to finance Bitcoin accumulation, benefiting in part
from demand among institutional investors. Index inclusion helps broaden this
investor base through passive funds, while exclusion could reduce a structural
source of demand and affect financing conditions. This does not prevent Strategy
from raising additional capital, since other financing channels and investors
not constrained by MSCI benchmarks remain available. The actual impact will
therefore depend on Strategy’s ability to maintain investor interest and the
sustainability of its financial strategy, without automatically resulting in a
reduction of its Bitcoin holdings or its capacity to accumulate additional
Bitcoin.</p> <h2><strong>Distinguishing operating companies from investment vehicles</strong></h2> <p>MSCI’s decision highlights the challenges involved in classifying companies
developing business models centered on digital assets. Traditional equity
indexes are generally designed to represent companies conducting operating
businesses, distinguishing them from funds and other vehicles whose value
primarily derives from investment management. Bitcoin treasury companies,
however, may exhibit characteristics of both categories, combining commercial
operations, asset management, capital raising, and the structuring of financial
products. This overlap makes the distinction between an operating company and an
investment vehicle less straightforward. In Strategy’s case, the issue is
particularly relevant because Bitcoin accumulation has become an integral part
of its business model rather than simply a treasury allocation decision.</p> <p>MSCI’s approach seeks to preserve methodological consistency by preventing
indexes designed to represent operating companies from including businesses that
economically resemble investment vehicles. Strategy’s position, by contrast,
highlights the risk that this distinction may fail to adequately recognize
entrepreneurial activities based on capital management and financial innovation.
The disagreement matters because index methodologies, although established by
private organizations, can materially influence companies’ access to
institutional investors. MSCI’s decision could also stimulate discussion among
other index providers, without necessarily leading them to adopt similar
criteria. For companies seeking to make Bitcoin a central component of their
business models, index eligibility could therefore become an important
consideration in financing strategies and balance sheet management.</p> <h2><strong>Conclusions</strong></h2> <p>Strategy’s exclusion from MSCI indexes marks a significant development in the
relationship between traditional finance and companies that use Bitcoin as their
primary treasury asset. The decision establishes a methodological distinction
between operating businesses and entities with predominantly financial
characteristics, applying it to business models that do not fit neatly into
traditional classifications. The immediate consequences concern portfolios
managed by passive funds tracking the affected indexes, while the effects on
capital raising and corporate strategy will depend on additional factors. The
exclusion does not directly alter Strategy’s Bitcoin reserves or prevent the
company from accessing capital markets, but it demonstrates the influence of
index methodologies on the allocation of institutional investment. The central
question is whether traditional classification frameworks can adequately
represent businesses that combine operating activities, asset management, and
financial innovation. The evolution of criteria adopted by major index providers
will help determine how these business models can continue to participate in
equity markets.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Deutsche Bank enters the European crypto market]]></title>
            <description><![CDATA[<img src="https://www.dgi.io/news-topics/share/istituzioni-finanziarie.jpg"> Financial institutions · Custody as the first step toward a broader financial services offering]]></description>
            <link>https://www.dgi.io/2026-11-12-deutsche-bank-crypto-market/</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dgi.io/2026-11-12-deutsche-bank-crypto-market/</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Staff]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 09:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <enclosure url="https://www.dgi.io/news-topics/share/istituzioni-finanziarie.jpg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On November 11, 2026, Deutsche Bank launched a crypto-asset custody service for
European institutional and corporate clients, following completion of the
regulatory notification process under MiCAR with Germany’s Federal Financial
Supervisory Authority (BaFin). The initial offering covers Bitcoin, Ether, and
selected stablecoins, allowing clients to transfer assets through the bank’s
infrastructure. At the same time, the group announced a preliminary agreement
with Deutsche Asset Management to explore the development of tokenized financial
products and other digital asset services. The initiative marks another step in
the entry of major European banks into the sector, with implications for
institutional custody, the expansion of financial services, and competition
between traditional banks and specialized digital asset providers.</p> <h2><strong>A new addition to the bank’s service offering</strong></h2> <p>Deutsche Bank’s entry into the crypto-asset market marks the culmination of a
multiyear effort to develop expertise and technology partnerships in digital
assets. In 2023, the bank announced a partnership with Taurus, a Swiss company
specializing in custody and tokenization infrastructure, and in September 2026
it unveiled plans for a service targeting European institutions. Completion of
the regulatory process allowed the bank to move from development to commercial
operations, with the launch announced on November 11. The initiative represents
a concrete first step toward a broader presence in the sector, potentially
extending beyond the services currently available.</p> <p>The initial offering covers custody and transfers of Bitcoin, Ether, and the
stablecoins USDC, EURC, and EURAU. It targets clients of Deutsche Bank’s
Corporate Bank and Investment Bank, including corporations, asset managers,
funds, and other financial intermediaries. Although trading and order execution
services are not initially included, the project forms part of a broader
strategy to develop digital asset activities. The bank intends to gradually
expand its offering, including through new blockchain applications and the
tokenization of financial instruments. The launch therefore establishes an
initial operational foundation that could allow Deutsche Bank to expand into
additional segments of the crypto-asset market and digital financial
infrastructure.</p> <h2><strong>MiCAR and the role of credit institutions</strong></h2> <p>Deutsche Bank’s entry into the crypto-asset market highlights MiCAR’s role in
establishing the conditions under which traditional financial institutions can
participate in the sector. The European regulation provides a specific route for
already authorized banks, allowing them to offer crypto-asset services through a
notification procedure with the competent authority, without obtaining a
separate authorization as a crypto-asset service provider (CASP). Deutsche Bank
followed this route under Article 60 and has been listed in the European
Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) register since October 12, 2026, with
BaFin as the competent authority. The notified scope covers custody,
administration, and transfer of crypto-assets, while any additional services
would require compliance with the relevant regulatory procedures.</p> <p>The distinction from specialized providers, which are subject to the
authorization process under Article 59, is an important feature of the evolving
European market. MiCAR allows banks to leverage their existing organizational
structures and authorizations, facilitating the expansion of their services into
digital assets. However, the notification procedure does not exempt banks from
the obligations applicable to the services they provide, including requirements
related to custody, client protection, and operational risk management. This
creates a regulated market in which banks and crypto-native firms can compete
under a common regulatory framework while following different routes to market
entry.</p> <h2><strong>Tokenization and the expansion of institutional services</strong></h2> <p>Alongside the custody launch, Deutsche Bank signed a memorandum of understanding
with Deutsche Asset Management, the group’s majority-owned asset management
business, to explore new opportunities in digital assets. The collaboration
primarily covers tokenized money market funds, exchange-traded products linked
to crypto-assets, and stablecoins, as well as settlement infrastructure and
liquidity management. The agreement remains exploratory and does not involve the
immediate launch of new products. It nevertheless indicates an intention to
develop a broader offering in which custody provides the foundation for
additional blockchain-based financial services.</p> <p>One relevant element is the involvement of the group’s asset management
business, formerly known as DWS, in AllUnity, a venture developed with Flow
Traders and Galaxy that issued the EURAU stablecoin, already supported by
Deutsche Bank’s new custody service. This connection highlights potential
synergies between the issuance of digital monetary instruments, custody, and the
tokenization of financial assets. Integrating these activities could support the
development of liquidity management and transaction settlement solutions,
expanding the operational capabilities available to financial intermediaries and
institutional investors.</p> <p>Tokenization has attracted growing interest across the financial sector because
of its potential to automate certain processes and improve the efficiency of
asset transfers and settlement. However, these benefits depend on infrastructure
interoperability, sufficient liquidity, and integration with existing financial
systems. For Deutsche Bank, the challenge will therefore be to turn these
partnerships into operational services and demonstrate the viability of these
models at an institutional scale.</p> <h2><strong>Competition between banks and crypto-native firms</strong></h2> <p>Deutsche Bank’s entry reflects growing interest among major banking groups in
the crypto-asset market, without necessarily reducing the competitive
opportunities available to crypto-native firms. Banks benefit from established
institutional relationships, significant distribution capabilities, and the
ability to integrate new services into their existing financial offerings.
Specialized providers, by contrast, may retain advantages in operational
flexibility, speed of innovation, and a broader range of services, potentially
including trading, staking, lending, and access to multiple blockchain
infrastructures. The presence of institutions with different strengths could
therefore support market expansion by addressing the diverse needs of
institutional clients.</p> <p>Technology development is another important area in which crypto-native firms
play a significant role, both by creating new solutions and by supplying
infrastructure and expertise to banks themselves. The entry of major banks can
therefore intensify competition in service distribution while also creating new
opportunities for technological collaboration. From this perspective, the
expansion of bank-led offerings could contribute to overall market growth, while
specialized providers continue to play an important role in infrastructure
development and the introduction of more advanced services.</p> <h2><strong>Conclusions</strong></h2> <p>The launch of Deutsche Bank’s custody service represents another step toward
integrating crypto-assets into the European financial system, illustrating how
major banking groups are progressively expanding their digital asset offerings.
MiCAR supports this development by establishing a common regulatory framework
that allows traditional financial institutions to enter the sector while
leveraging their existing authorizations and organizational structures. The
initiative also has strategic significance for tokenization, which could extend
the use of blockchain infrastructure to a broader range of financial instruments
and services. However, the expansion of banks does not necessarily diminish the
role of crypto-native firms, which retain potential competitive advantages in
specialization, technological innovation, and the breadth of their offerings.
Instead, a market is emerging in which traditional financial institutions and
specialized providers can both compete and collaborate, contributing to the
development of complementary services. The significance of this transformation
will ultimately depend on the ability to turn announced initiatives into
solutions that achieve meaningful adoption among institutional investors.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The CLARITY Act after the Democrats’ midterm victory]]></title>
            <description><![CDATA[<img src="https://www.dgi.io/news-topics/share/regolamentazione.jpg"> Regulation · The new majority reshapes regulatory oversight priorities]]></description>
            <link>https://www.dgi.io/2026-11-06-clarity-act-after-midterm/</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dgi.io/2026-11-06-clarity-act-after-midterm/</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Staff]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 06 Nov 2026 09:45:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <enclosure url="https://www.dgi.io/news-topics/share/regolamentazione.jpg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Democrats’ victory in the November 3, 2026, midterm elections, securing
majorities in both the House of Representatives and the Senate, changes the
outlook for digital asset regulation in the United States. The CLARITY Act,
legislation designed to define the responsibilities of federal regulators and
establish rules for market intermediaries, faces further delays and potentially
substantial revisions. The new political balance makes passage of the bill in
its current form more difficult, following disagreements between Republicans and
Democrats. The election results do not, however, signal an end to regulatory
efforts, but rather shift the debate toward greater emphasis on investor
protection, market oversight, and conflicts of interest. The key distinction
concerns the prospects for comprehensive federal legislation and the ability of
regulatory agencies to act under their existing authority.</p> <h2><strong>The CLARITY Act and the legislative deadlock</strong></h2> <p>The CLARITY Act seeks to address the fragmentation of the US regulatory
framework, in which the classification of digital assets determines the relevant
authorities, applicable obligations, and supervisory requirements. One of the
central issues is the distinction between securities regulated by the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) and assets falling under the jurisdiction of the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). Uncertainty surrounding token
classification has generated disputes between companies and regulators, making
it difficult to determine in advance which obligations must be met. The proposed
legislation aims to establish clearer statutory criteria while regulating
trading platforms, intermediaries, and certain activities in digital asset
markets. Its adoption would therefore have operational implications for
intermediary registration, the allocation of regulatory responsibilities, and
the development of services within a more predictable federal framework.</p> <p>The legislative process had already encountered significant obstacles before the
elections. On July 17, 2025, the House of Representatives approved the CLARITY
Act by 294 votes to 134, including support from 78 Democratic lawmakers.
However, progress subsequently stalled in the Senate on September 15, 2026, when
a procedural vote failed to reach the 60-vote threshold required to advance
consideration of the legislation. Disagreements primarily concerned investor
protection, the allocation of responsibilities between the SEC and CFTC, and
conflicts of interest. Another unresolved issue involved compensation associated
with stablecoin holdings, an area where banks and digital asset operators have
competing interests. The election results therefore affect an already incomplete
legislative process rather than interrupting a reform approaching
implementation. The outgoing Congress formally retains its powers until the
newly elected members take office in January 2027, leaving a limited and
politically challenging legislative window.</p> <h2><strong>The new majority and the conditions for negotiation</strong></h2> <p>Control of both chambers gives Democrats the ability to shape the legislative
agenda, chair congressional committees, and strengthen oversight of the Trump
administration. This shift reduces the likelihood of passing the CLARITY Act in
its current form and could require revisions to its most contentious provisions.
The prospect of stricter supervision and expanded congressional investigations
changes the political conditions under which future agreements would need to be
negotiated. However, the new composition of Congress does not imply uniform
Democratic opposition to digital assets, as several Democratic lawmakers have
also supported initiatives aimed at establishing federal regulatory rules. The
central challenge is therefore building a majority around a mutually acceptable
legislative framework amid differing priorities and interests.</p> <p>The new political environment also raises the possibility that Democrats could
develop an alternative proposal rather than simply opposing the existing
legislation. One option under discussion involves expanding an earlier amendment
introduced by Maxine Waters, a Democratic representative from California and a
leading Democratic voice on the House Financial Services Committee. A new
initiative could incorporate provisions considered during previous negotiations
while giving the SEC a broader supervisory role than envisaged under the CLARITY
Act. However, this remains a preliminary possibility rather than a formally
introduced legislative proposal. Even a potential congressional agreement would
have to contend with President Trump’s position, including his veto power, and
the Senate’s procedural rules, where a simple majority does not necessarily
guarantee overcoming a filibuster. The election outcome therefore changes the
parties’ negotiating positions without ensuring the adoption of an alternative
regulatory framework.</p> <h2><strong>SEC, CFTC, and investor protection</strong></h2> <p>The allocation of responsibilities between the SEC and CFTC represents one of
the main differences between competing legislative approaches. The CLARITY Act
envisages a significant role for the CFTC in overseeing spot markets for digital
assets classified as commodities, while preserving the SEC’s jurisdiction over
securities. This distinction matters because the two agencies operate under
different mandates, supervisory tools, and regulatory requirements. The SEC has
an established framework of disclosure obligations and investor protection
measures, whereas the CFTC has traditionally focused its oversight on
derivatives and certain forms of misconduct in commodity markets. A different
allocation of responsibilities could change the requirements imposed on
intermediaries and the regulatory treatment of specific activities without
necessarily altering the economic characteristics of the tokens being traded.</p> <p>The approach supported by some Democrats places greater emphasis on customer
safeguards, drawing on measures proposed by Maxine Waters in 2025. The earlier
amendment included requirements concerning asset segregation, availability of
customer funds, management of conflicts of interest, and periodic verification
of reserves. Asset segregation seeks to separate customer holdings from an
intermediary’s own assets, reducing the risk of their inclusion in insolvency
proceedings. Reserve verification, meanwhile, can provide evidence of certain
asset holdings, although it does not automatically replace a comprehensive audit
of liabilities and internal controls. Reintroducing these measures could
increase compliance costs and responsibilities for operators, while potentially
supporting greater confidence among institutional investors. Their actual scope
would nevertheless depend on the wording of any future proposal and the outcome
of legislative negotiations.</p> <h2><strong>Federal oversight and implications for the industry</strong></h2> <p>Delays to the CLARITY Act would not suspend US regulatory activity, as the SEC
and CFTC can continue exercising their powers under existing legislation. The
SEC has already launched initiatives to clarify how securities laws apply to
digital assets, developing interpretations and regulatory proposals through its
dedicated organizational structure. These initiatives can help establish
classification criteria, disclosure obligations, and registration pathways
without necessarily requiring new congressional legislation. Their scope
nevertheless remains constrained by the authority granted to regulators and may
be subject to judicial challenges or subsequent revisions. Comprehensive
legislation could provide a more stable foundation, particularly in areas where
regulatory responsibilities overlap or remain insufficiently defined.</p> <p>The new Congress will also be able to influence the direction of oversight
through hearings, investigations, funding decisions, and confirmation procedures
for federal appointments. Particular attention could focus on financial
relationships involving digital asset companies, public officials, and
individuals connected to the Trump administration, which have already generated
political controversy. For intermediaries, legislative uncertainty could
lengthen planning horizons for investments, new service development, and the
establishment of compliant operating structures. The consequences would likely
differ between operators already subject to established authorization regimes
and companies whose business models depend on the introduction of new regulatory
categories. The international comparison is also relevant, as the European Union
already operates under the Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MiCAR), while
the United States continues to develop its broader federal framework through
separate legislative and administrative initiatives. Harmonized European rules
do not eliminate differences in implementation across jurisdictions, but they
provide operators with an established regulatory reference.</p> <h2><strong>Conclusions</strong></h2> <p>The Democrats’ victory makes passage of the CLARITY Act in its current form more
difficult, but it does not eliminate the possibility of reforming US digital
asset regulation. The most significant change concerns the political conditions
for negotiation, in which investor protection, the SEC’s authority, and
conflicts of interest could assume greater importance. The possibility of
developing an alternative proposal suggests that legislative discussions may
continue on different terms, although neither the content nor the timing of any
future legislation is assured. Meanwhile, federal regulators retain the ability
to act within their existing legal authority, helping define certain operational
rules even in the absence of comprehensive legislation. Assessing future
developments will therefore require distinguishing between the formal
introduction of new bills, the formation of bipartisan agreements, and the
implementation of concrete regulatory measures. The central issue remains
whether the US political system can translate differing regulatory priorities
into a coherent, enforceable, and sufficiently stable framework for market
participants and investors.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Binance, EIP-7702, and delegation security]]></title>
            <description><![CDATA[<img src="https://www.dgi.io/news-topics/share/tecnologia.jpg"> Technology · Signature controls for wallets that execute contract code]]></description>
            <link>https://www.dgi.io/2026-11-04-binance-eip-7702-delegation-security/</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dgi.io/2026-11-04-binance-eip-7702-delegation-security/</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Staff]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 04 Nov 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <enclosure url="https://www.dgi.io/news-topics/share/tecnologia.jpg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The attack on Binance on October 29, 2026, resulted in the theft of
approximately $6.3 billion in assets. On Ethereum, the attackers used the
delegation features introduced by EIP-7702 to make one of the exchange’s wallets
execute code under their control. Once recorded on the network, the delegation
allowed funds to be moved through calls to the wallet without new signatures
from that account, including funds received afterward. This control persisted
until the delegation was removed or replaced, regardless of the exchange’s
suspension of withdrawals. The incident brings renewed attention to custody
security and the powers a signature can grant beyond an individual transaction.</p> <h2><strong>Signing as the point of compromise</strong></h2> <p>The attack combined ordinary transfers and delegation authorizations, both based
on valid signatures attributable to Binance wallets. In its preliminary report
published on November 3, the exchange described unauthorized access to an
internal signing service used to initiate operations outside its normal
withdrawal process. Transfers affected several networks, including Bitcoin,
Tron, and Solana, while EIP-7702 was also used on Ethereum. Delegation was
therefore one of the mechanisms used in the attack and does not, by itself,
explain the thefts on the other blockchains. Verifiable signatures link the
authorizations to the wallets involved, while reconstructing access to the
systems requires evidence from the internal infrastructure.</p> <p>Protecting the material required to sign and controlling the requests submitted
to the signer are distinct layers of security. A compromised service can obtain
signatures on unauthorized instructions without directly extracting a private
key. Binance clarified that the affected wallet used a system based on
multiparty computation (MPC), in which several components contribute to
producing a signature. Distributed signing does not replace checks on requests,
which can be correctly formatted while violating the custodian’s operating
rules. The preliminary report dated November 3 describes a campaign involving
multiple devices and services, with the investigation and independent review
still ongoing.</p> <h2><strong>How control over an account changes</strong></h2> <p>EIP-7702, introduced with the Pectra upgrade on May 7, 2025, allows an Ethereum
account directly controlled by a private key to execute smart contract code. The
holder can add wallet functionality while keeping the same address and without
moving funds elsewhere. This makes it possible to bundle several operations into
one transaction, have another party pay the fees, or define specific rules for
using funds. Spending limits and restricted permissions depend on the code
chosen to manage the wallet, because the upgrade enables these features without
enforcing them automatically. Delegation allows the code to act in the account’s
context, with access to its balances and the rights it can exercise against
other contracts.</p> <p>The signed authorization specifies the contract whose code will be used, the
chain identifier, and the account’s nonce, the counter checked by the protocol
when applying the delegation. A reference to that code is recorded in the
account, allowing the code to execute when the wallet receives a call. The
delegation persists beyond the transaction that introduced it, until it is
replaced or removed through a new valid authorization. The delegation signature
is separate from the signature on the transaction that publishes it, which
another party can submit and pay for. Anyone able to produce a valid signature
for the account retains the power to authorize transfers and change the
delegation, even when the code requires multiple approvals. Using distributed
signing remains a separate design choice, requiring its own controls over the
components involved.</p> <h2><strong>From delegation to draining the wallet</strong></h2> <p>According to TRM Labs’ analysis, the attackers submitted a single transaction
containing fifty EIP-7702 authorizations signed with the key associated with
Binance 14, one of the exchange’s Ethereum wallets. The authorizations covered
consecutive nonce values to accommodate an account that was still processing
transactions. One authorization was applied, recording the reference to the
attacker’s code and enabling it to execute in the wallet’s context. A valid
signature alone does not make a delegation applicable, since the requirements
concerning the chain, nonce, and account state must also be met. The number of
authorizations documents preparation of the operational sequence without, by
itself, establishing how the signatures were obtained.</p> <p>Blockaid estimated that the assets moved in the first major operation from
Binance 14 were worth approximately $2.5 billion at prices prevailing at the
time. In its reconstruction, the code allowed the attacker to issue instructions
and call other contracts through the compromised account. The delegated wallet
also held control rights over a separate Binance smart account, enabling
additional USDC transfers. The persistent delegation allowed subsequent thefts
of funds received after the initial drain, through further calls to the wallet.
A new Binance 14 signature was not required for every transfer executed through
that code. The exposure therefore included new balances and rights exercisable
over other accounts, in addition to the original holdings.</p> <h2><strong>Signature controls and wallet permissions</strong></h2> <p>An authorization that changes the code executed by a wallet requires a different
review from the one applied to withdrawals. That review covers the designated
contract’s behavior, any mechanisms for updating it, and the network on which
the signature can be used. A chain identifier of zero allows the authorization
to be reused on other networks supporting EIP-7702, provided the account
conditions allow it to be applied. Reviewing the signed data precedes signing
and concerns the delegation itself, which does not specify amounts or recipients
for subsequent transfers. A transaction’s zero value therefore does not imply
zero financial exposure when it changes the account’s permissions. Separation of
duties extends to the systems that prepare, verify, and sign requests, reducing
approvers’ dependence on a single representation of the operation.</p> <p>Monitoring covers changes to delegation and the powers each wallet exercises
over other accounts. Suspending withdrawals through the service does not remove
an active delegation, because external calls can continue to execute its code.
Removal requires a new valid authorization specifying the zero address instead
of the delegated contract. Emergency signing procedures therefore remain
important in MPC systems, where the components needed to produce that signature
must be coordinated. Revocation neither reverses completed transfers nor cancels
any spending permissions granted within token contracts, which require separate
checks. Preventing further unauthorized signing and suspending treasury
transfers to exposed addresses also remain necessary, because revocation alone
does not restore the infrastructure’s integrity.</p> <h2><strong>Conclusions</strong></h2> <p>In the Binance attack, EIP-7702 delegation extended the effects of the
compromise beyond individual transfers, granting the attackers persistent powers
over funds. The upgrade provided an execution mechanism, while the exchange’s
preliminary report places the unauthorized access within its internal signing
service. These findings concern distinct layers and do not establish a breach of
Ethereum’s protocol rules. For custody, controls therefore encompass signature
production, the powers granted through delegation, and permissions that can
remain active after delegation is removed. The system’s robustness is measured
by its ability to maintain independent checks and containment procedures that
remain usable during an incident, reducing the risk that compromising one
component leads to control over assets.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Digital Gold Institute Monthly report - October 2026]]></title>
            <description><![CDATA[<img src="https://www.dgi.io/analyses/dgi-monthly-report-2026-10-en.webp"> Monthly report · A monthly analysis of crypto-asset markets, combining quantitative data and indicators with an assessment of key developments across the ecosystem, regulation, and technology.]]></description>
            <link>https://www.dgi.io/analysis-research/#dgi-monthly-report-2026-10</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dgi.io/analysis-research/#dgi-monthly-report-2026-10</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Digital Gold Institute]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 31 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <enclosure url="https://www.dgi.io/analyses/dgi-monthly-report-2026-10-en.webp" length="0" type="image/webp"/>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<img src="https://www.dgi.io/analyses/dgi-monthly-report-2026-10-en.webp" alt=""><p>A monthly analysis of crypto-asset markets, combining quantitative data and indicators with an assessment of key developments across the ecosystem, regulation, and technology.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Arbitrum freezes funds stolen from Binance]]></title>
            <description><![CDATA[<img src="https://www.dgi.io/news-topics/share/tecnologia.jpg"> Technology · Protection of funds and user autonomy on layer 2 networks]]></description>
            <link>https://www.dgi.io/2026-10-30-arbitrum-freezes-binance-funds/</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dgi.io/2026-10-30-arbitrum-freezes-binance-funds/</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Staff]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 30 Oct 2026 15:45:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <enclosure url="https://www.dgi.io/news-topics/share/tecnologia.jpg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On 30 October 2026, Arbitrum’s Security Council froze 8,425 ETH and
approximately 74.6 million ARB, reportedly worth around $30.5 million in total,
held on Arbitrum One by an address linked to the Binance hack. The funds were
transferred to an intermediate address, removing them from the original
address’s control. The ability to intervene can provide an additional safeguard
for financial institutions, while raising questions about autonomy for users who
associate blockchain with full disintermediation. The case illustrates how
assessing a network also involves weighing asset protection against control over
funds.</p> <h2><strong>Arbitrum and emergency powers</strong></h2> <p>Arbitrum One is an Ethereum layer 2 network designed to process transactions at
lower cost while using the main network for settlement and data availability.
Transactions are processed on a separate infrastructure, with their results and
data published on Ethereum. This architecture combines the main network’s
security mechanisms with a governance system of its own, including the ability
to upgrade essential components of the protocol. Understanding how it works
therefore requires examining both how transactions are verified and who is
authorized to modify the infrastructure that executes them.</p> <p>Within Arbitrum’s architecture, the Security Council is a committee of twelve
members elected by ArbitrumDAO, whose governance involves ARB token holders and
their delegates. The DAO’s Constitution grants the Council powers to intervene
immediately in security emergencies, subject to approval by at least nine
members. This mechanism allows action without waiting for a standard governance
proposal to complete, a process whose timescale would be difficult to reconcile
with an ongoing attack. The approval threshold distributes authorization across
several individuals, while the ability to intervene remains concentrated in an
identifiable body.</p> <h2><strong>How the stolen funds were frozen</strong></h2> <p>According to estimates published by Binance on 30 October, the attack affected
assets worth approximately $6.3 billion, of which around $3 billion had been
frozen across multiple networks. The exchange also stated that it had earmarked
more than $6.34 billion of its own funds to cover the losses and restore
customer balances. This amount excludes the frozen assets, which remain subject
to recovery efforts. The final net loss will therefore depend on how much can
ultimately be recovered, while the funding announced by Binance is intended to
protect customers regardless of the outcome of those efforts.</p> <p>To move the assets on Arbitrum One, the Security Council temporarily upgraded an
Ethereum contract that handles incoming messages to the layer 2 network. The
change enabled two transactions to be generated on behalf of the address linked
to the attack, transferring its funds without authorization from the party
controlling them. Within the same operation, the contract was restored to its
previous implementation. According to the official account, other users and
applications were unaffected. The temporary nature of the change relates to the
code used to execute the transfer, while the administrative authority that made
the intervention possible remains part of the governance architecture.</p> <p>The involvement of ETH distinguishes this case from the freezing of certain
stablecoins, whose issuers can prevent transfers through functions built into
the token contract. USDC contracts, for example, include an authorized role that
can add addresses to a blocklist. On Arbitrum, the intervention used privileges
over the network’s infrastructure to move both ETH and ARB. Control of private
keys remains essential for ordinary transactions, while upgrade powers can
affect access to funds in exceptional circumstances. Transaction execution
without intermediaries can therefore coexist with powers of intervention
entrusted to third parties.</p> <h2><strong>From freezing funds to returning them</strong></h2> <p>Transferring funds to an intermediate address removes them from the control of
their previous holder, while leaving their eventual destination to be decided.
The technical account published on Arbitrum’s forum refers to an ArbitrumDAO
vote, to be coordinated with the relevant parties. The emergency intervention
therefore preserves the assets pending further decisions, without ensuring their
immediate return. Recovery by the exchange remains separate from the restoration
of customer balances, which Binance has committed to financing from its own
resources.</p> <p>The distinction between immobilizing assets and determining their destination is
also evident in the April 2026 precedent, when the Security Council froze
approximately 30,766 ETH linked to the KelpDAO attack. A subsequent governance
proposal requested that those assets be transferred to a coordinated recovery
program intended to restore the backing of rsETH, the token involved in the
incident. The proposal specified the recipients, the intended use of the funds
and the procedures required for their release. The case shows how the stage
following a freeze requires decisions on the distribution of recovered value,
potentially involving several operators and the effects of the attack on
connected services.</p> <h2><strong>Protection of funds and user autonomy</strong></h2> <p>For financial institutions, the ability to activate an intervention after a
theft can make an infrastructure more compatible with the need to protect assets
entrusted by customers. The existence of a body able to act creates a
possibility of recovery that can complement preventive controls and financial
resources available to absorb losses, without ensuring the same outcome in every
incident. The value of this safeguard depends on the speed of the response and
the conditions under which it can be activated. Assessing a network therefore
also involves its ability to contain the consequences of fraud, alongside its
capacity to prevent unauthorized access.</p> <p>For users who associate blockchain with full disintermediation and censorship
resistance, the same capacity to intervene places a limit on the autonomy they
seek. The case shows that personal control of private keys can coexist with
third-party powers over the movement of funds. Even an intervention intended to
contain a theft therefore confirms the existence of an authority capable of
overriding the normal operation of addresses. The financial benefit of recovery
and its compatibility with the freedom users seek become separate
considerations. A function valued by those who prioritize the possibility of
remedying fraud may be less acceptable to those who place greater emphasis on
exclusive control over their assets.</p> <p>Assessing these powers requires, in both cases, transparency about the
conditions governing their use and the responsibilities of those exercising
them. Arbitrum’s Constitution requires the Security Council to publish a report
explaining its actions and the reasons for invoking emergency powers; the DAO
can modify or revoke those powers through the prescribed procedures. Transaction
records allow the technical execution to be reconstructed, while examining the
reasons for the intervention makes it possible to assess how the delegated
authority was exercised. For network users, trust therefore also depends on the
predictability with which these powers are applied.</p> <h2><strong>Conclusions</strong></h2> <p>The Arbitrum case illustrates how the possibility of recovering funds and the
absence of third-party intervention powers reflect different priorities in the
use of blockchain networks. For financial institutions, a mechanism capable of
preserving assets after a theft can provide an additional safeguard and support
adoption of the infrastructure, provided that responsibilities and procedures
are clearly defined. For those seeking full autonomy, the same powers introduce
a dependence on governance even when exercised for the benefit of victims.
Assessing a network therefore also depends on the degree of control users wish
to retain and the trust they are willing to place in those authorized to
intervene.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Visa expands its use of stablecoins in payments]]></title>
            <description><![CDATA[<img src="https://www.dgi.io/news-topics/share/istituzioni-finanziarie.jpg"> Financial institutions · Stablecoins between integration and competition]]></description>
            <link>https://www.dgi.io/2026-10-27-visa-stablecoin-payments/</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dgi.io/2026-10-27-visa-stablecoin-payments/</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Staff]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 27 Oct 2026 09:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <enclosure url="https://www.dgi.io/news-topics/share/istituzioni-finanziarie.jpg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Visa’s annualized stablecoin settlement volume has surpassed $25 billion, ten
times its level a year earlier. This expansion puts stablecoins in competition
with traditional transfer and settlement services, while integrating them allows
Visa to participate in payment flows that could develop outside its network. The
network’s value therefore also depends on the services surrounding the transfer
itself, including access to merchants and coordination among the participants.</p> <h2><strong>From payment to settlement</strong></h2> <p>Visa operates the network connecting card issuers with acquirers, the providers
handling payments for merchants; both roles are performed by banks and other
intermediaries. When a terminal confirms a purchase, the customer sees that the
transaction has been authorized, while the parties involved must subsequently
settle the amounts owed, which may reflect the aggregation of multiple payments.
Visa allows eligible partners to use stablecoins at this stage, changing how
funds move between participants without requiring each purchase to generate a
blockchain transaction.</p> <p>For an operator already holding liquidity in USDC, using it to settle
obligations to Visa can reduce the need to convert it into fiat currency and
route it through additional banking arrangements. Merchants can continue
receiving fiat currency and consumers can keep using their cards. This
separation between the payment experience and the settlement infrastructure
explains why adoption can progress without an explicit request from end users.
Intermediaries make the decision by comparing the available options for funding
and settling the flows they already handle.</p> <h2><strong>The economic value of liquidity</strong></h2> <p>The potential benefit emerges when infrastructure operating hours force an
operator to position funds before they are actually needed. A company active
across several markets may have to prefund payments over a weekend, maintaining
precautionary balances in multiple accounts. The ability to transfer stablecoins
around the clock can allow liquidity to be managed more closely in line with
requirements: this is the rationale behind the Visa Direct capability that
enables cross-border payment balances to be funded in USDC.</p> <p>Greater flexibility can reduce the time liquidity is tied up, but operators
still need their own funds or credit when payments to the network fall due
before funds are collected from users, even if settlement takes place on a
blockchain. Credit facilities linked to Visa’s settlement data show how
disbursements can be aligned more closely with amounts due, coordinating the
movement of funds with the financing needed to support it.</p> <p>Cost-effectiveness must nevertheless be assessed across the entire process,
including conversions, availability of the required currency and the cost of the
services involved. A Bank of Italy study based on transfers of 200 USDC across
ten international corridors found no systematic cost advantage over traditional
channels. The main frictions arose when moving into and out of stablecoins,
while the blockchain transfer itself accounted for only a small share of the
cost. Although the study concerned retail remittances, its findings illustrate a
principle relevant to institutional use: reducing the cost of one component
creates value when it improves the economics of the service as a whole.</p> <h2><strong>Why Visa is integrating stablecoins</strong></h2> <p>The value of a network such as Visa comes from providing access to merchants,
supporting transaction authorization and coordinating participants that use
different systems. By integrating stablecoins into settlement and linking them
to cards, Visa can participate in new flows while retaining a role in the
payment process. The spread of an alternative technology can therefore also
increase demand for the services of providers able to incorporate it. The
existing acceptance network reduces the need for new providers to persuade
merchants individually to adopt a different payment instrument.</p> <p>Support for five stablecoins across ten blockchains highlights the value of
connecting these systems. The ability to transfer a token on a network does not
ensure that every counterparty can use it to meet its obligations or convert it
into the required currency. Acceptance of the instrument, access to liquidity
and integration with operational processes all matter, and Visa seeks to
coordinate these elements within its network. The competitive implication is
that more open infrastructure can coexist with the concentration of services
among providers able to bring together networks, currencies and commercial
relationships.</p> <p>This choice can also be interpreted as a response to the risk that other
providers build payment services around direct stablecoin transfers. If more
merchants were able to receive and manage them, some purchases could take place
without a card. In that scenario, payment networks’ position would depend more
heavily on the quality of their additional services and overall
cost-effectiveness for payers and payees. The commercial value of integration
will therefore depend on the services users and operators are willing to pay
for.</p> <h2><strong>From digital wallets to everyday spending</strong></h2> <p>Visa has more than 225 stablecoin-linked card programs, covering around five
million cards in more than 50 countries, with transaction volumes increasing by
over 150% year on year. These cards allow holders to spend digital wallet
balances at merchants on the network, while the program manager checks that
funds are available and arranges any necessary conversion. Merchants can
continue receiving fiat currency without having to handle tokens, while users
can spend their digital balances through a familiar payment instrument.</p> <p>Stablecoin-linked cards and stablecoin settlement therefore represent two
distinct dimensions of adoption. The former change how cardholders fund their
spending, with balances potentially converted into fiat currency before
settlement; the latter change the instrument intermediaries use to settle
obligations to the network, even for payments denominated in fiat currency. The
distinction helps interpret growth figures correctly and assess where benefits
arise: in enabling everyday spending, in managing flows between participants, or
in combining the two functions.</p> <h2><strong>Conclusions</strong></h2> <p>Visa’s approach illustrates how stablecoin adoption involves both the management
of financial flows and access to the services businesses and consumers use to
make payments. Integration can make settlement more flexible, while merchant
acceptance and coordination among participants remain part of the service
provided by the network. Visa’s competitive position will depend on its ability
to combine these elements into an offering that compares favorably with
alternatives, including those built directly on blockchain. The economic case
needs to be assessed across the entire payment process, taking account of
liquidity management, conversion costs and ease of use.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Bitcoin Core updates its security policy]]></title>
            <description><![CDATA[<img src="https://www.dgi.io/news-topics/share/tecnologia.jpg"> Technology · Confidentiality and timely security fixes in the age of AI]]></description>
            <link>https://www.dgi.io/2026-10-23-bitcoin-core-security-policy-update/</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dgi.io/2026-10-23-bitcoin-core-security-policy-update/</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Staff]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 23 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <enclosure url="https://www.dgi.io/news-topics/share/tecnologia.jpg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On 22 October 2026, Bitcoin Core updated its vulnerability disclosure policy,
introducing an accelerated process for flaws that are easy to discover. Proposed
by developer Antoine Poinsot, the change reflects the ability of artificial
intelligence models to reduce the effort needed to identify certain problems in
software code. When the likelihood of independent discovery increases,
withholding information may offer less protection while delaying the
availability of fixes. The change therefore concerns both risk assessment and
the management of the time between discovering a vulnerability and deploying a
fix, with implications for financial infrastructure built on Bitcoin.</p> <h2><strong>Software and network security</strong></h2> <p>Bitcoin Core is an open-source project whose software descends from the program
published by Satoshi Nakamoto and is one of the main implementations used to
participate in the Bitcoin network. It allows users to run a full node, a system
that independently validates blocks and transactions against the protocol’s
rules, and includes wallet functionality. The security of transactions also
depends on the software’s ability to apply these rules correctly and continue
operating when it receives data designed to disrupt it. For a financial
intermediary using this infrastructure, a flaw can therefore affect transaction
verification and service continuity even when the keys used to authorize
transfers remain secure.</p> <p>An incident in September 2018 illustrates how the handling of information can
influence the response to this type of problem. Developers fixed a vulnerability
that could have allowed bitcoin to be created beyond the limits set by the
protocol, initially releasing the fix alongside a description of the aspect of
the flaw that could cause nodes to crash. Full disclosure of the more serious
risk was delayed to encourage users to upgrade. Confidentiality was therefore
intended to give those responsible for protecting systems a head start. Its
value depended on preserving that advantage long enough for the fix to be widely
deployed.</p> <h2><strong>When confidentiality becomes less effective</strong></h2> <p>The period during which details of a vulnerability remain confidential,
generally known as an embargo, aims to limit the information available to anyone
who might exploit it. In publicly available software, however, a fix can itself
provide clues about the underlying flaw. Poinsot explained that applying the
same change to earlier versions can reveal its security purpose, leading the
project to delay its availability until the next major release. The protection
afforded by confidentiality thus carries a tangible cost, as some users continue
running vulnerable code while developers seek to prevent the problem from being
identified.</p> <p>By analyzing code and comparing changes, artificial intelligence tools can
reduce the effort required to reconstruct what developers are temporarily trying
to keep confidential. According to Poinsot, this applies both to certain
categories of vulnerability and to the identification of fixes introduced
without highlighting their purpose. This changes the assessment of the time
advantage an embargo can provide. If the same problem can easily be discovered
independently, delaying a fix risks leaving users exposed without delivering a
proportionate benefit. The value of confidentiality therefore also depends on
how quickly and at what cost others can obtain the same information.</p> <p>These stronger analytical capabilities also give developers an opportunity to
identify and address flaws that might otherwise remain hidden. An increase in
reports should therefore be interpreted in light of improvements in research
tools. A problem discovered today may have existed in the code for some time,
while its discovery creates an opportunity to address it. The number of reported
flaws, taken in isolation, consequently provides an incomplete measure of
security. Assessing how security evolves also requires consideration of the
severity of confirmed problems, their practical exploitability and the time
needed to eliminate them from systems in use.</p> <h2><strong>Severity and ease of discovery</strong></h2> <p>Under the updated policy, easily discoverable vulnerabilities will be fixed as
soon as possible across all maintained major versions, with a security advisory
published alongside the updates. Other flaws remain subject to a disclosure
schedule based on severity. Low-severity issues will be disclosed two weeks
after the release of a major version containing the fix. For medium- and
high-severity issues, disclosure will follow two weeks after the last affected
version reaches the end of its support period, roughly a year after the first
release containing the fix. Critical cases will continue to require a tailored
response.</p> <p>The decision supplements the assessment of potential damage with a criterion
based on the likelihood that others will discover the flaw. Where the
consequences are comparable, a vulnerability that is easy to identify may make
distributing a fix more urgent, because the information is less likely to remain
confined to those handling it. A flaw capable of bringing down an
internet-facing node, for example, may require rapid action even when Bitcoin’s
monetary rules remain intact. For a financial operator, infrastructure
availability represents a dimension of risk distinct from the possibility of
funds being stolen, with consequences for its ability to provide services.</p> <p>The decision to distribute fixes to earlier versions that remain supported also
recognizes why operators take a gradual approach to upgrades. A major release
may introduce broader changes that require testing of connected applications,
whereas a maintenance update can limit the scope of the changes that need to be
assessed. This can reduce the operational cost of deploying a fix and encourage
its adoption. The benefit remains confined, however, to the maintenance window,
which covers the three most recent major versions. Continuing to run unsupported
software for an extended period can therefore turn an initially cautious
operational decision into a source of exposure.</p> <h2><strong>From fixes to risk reduction</strong></h2> <p>Publishing an update and its security advisory at the same time also changes the
position of users who need to act on their own systems. While making a solution
available, the announcement also provides information that can help potential
attackers understand the flaw. After release, operators’ advantage therefore
depends on how quickly they can assess the impact, complete the necessary checks
and install the corrected version. Time saved by developers can be lost through
delays in deployment, leaving exposed the very systems that could have benefited
from the intervention. The new policy thus increases the importance of
coordination between software maintenance and infrastructure management.</p> <p>Pressure to act quickly also requires the quality of review to be preserved,
since a fix must resolve the identified problem while ensuring that connected
components continue to function correctly. AI-assisted analysis can increase the
number of reports available, while confirming a flaw and verifying the solution
still require expertise and careful assessment. For financial intermediaries,
this creates a need for processes that calibrate testing to the vulnerability’s
actual risk and the scope of the change. A timely response becomes sustainable
when it rests on an understanding of system dependencies and upgrade procedures
prepared before an urgent problem arises.</p> <h2><strong>Conclusions</strong></h2> <p>Bitcoin Core’s policy update shows how advances in research tools can require
established security practices to be reconsidered. The value of an embargo
depends on the time it actually gives users, while artificial intelligence can
narrow that margin for certain categories of flaw. The project’s response
recognizes this change and prioritizes the availability of fixes where
confidentiality offers less protection. For those using Bitcoin in financial
services, the effectiveness of this approach will need to be assessed across the
entire process from discovery to deployment. The most meaningful measure will be
the ability to reduce the period during which a vulnerability remains
exploitable in practice.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Kraken’s move into European banking]]></title>
            <description><![CDATA[<img src="https://www.dgi.io/news-topics/share/istituzioni-finanziarie.jpg"> Financial institutions · Crypto firms and disintermediation risk for banks]]></description>
            <link>https://www.dgi.io/2026-10-20-payward-acquires-saldo-bank/</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dgi.io/2026-10-20-payward-acquires-saldo-bank/</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Staff]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 20 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <enclosure url="https://www.dgi.io/news-topics/share/istituzioni-finanziarie.jpg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Payward, the parent company of crypto exchange Kraken, announced an agreement on
14 October 2026 to acquire Lithuania’s Saldo Bank through its Finnish holding
company, Saldo Finance Oy. The transaction is expected to close in 2027, subject
to the necessary regulatory approvals. The acquisition would broaden the group’s
European offering, adding interest-bearing deposits and lending to its
crypto-asset services. While some traditional institutions continue to assess
how to enter the crypto market, firms originating in the sector are investing to
compete in deposit-taking and lending. Competition is thus extending to the
broader financial relationship with clients.</p> <h2><strong>The significance of the acquisition</strong></h2> <p>Saldo Bank’s strategic value lies in access to an established banking
infrastructure. Payward would acquire an institution authorized to accept
deposits, provide credit and deliver payment services, together with the
expertise and operational capabilities required to support these activities. For
a crypto firm, integrating a bank can reduce reliance on external intermediaries
and provide greater autonomy in developing its services. Kraken’s strategy
therefore recognizes the continuing importance of traditional banking functions
as crypto-asset services evolve. Integrating these functions would also entail
the corresponding management and control obligations. The transaction
illustrates how the growth of crypto-native firms can extend into banking,
bringing them into direct competition with institutions that have supported part
of their operations.</p> <h2><strong>From trading to a banking relationship</strong></h2> <p>Payward intends to play a broader role in meeting the financial needs of
European clients. Combining deposits and lending with trading services could
encourage more frequent use of the platform and strengthen the continuity of the
relationship. An investor who uses an exchange solely to buy bitcoin may keep
cash at a bank and rely on that institution for other financial needs. A broader
offering would allow some of those funds and transactions to remain within the
same group. Retaining client funds between investments therefore has commercial
significance. Kraken could capture a larger share of clients’ assets and
strengthen its relationship with them during periods of lower activity in crypto
markets.</p> <p>Entering banking would allow Payward to diversify its revenue sources,
supplementing trading fees with interest income generated from lending funded by
deposits. The difference between interest earned on loans and the cost of
remunerating deposits would provide a source of income distinct from trading
revenues. The project also includes banking-as-a-service capabilities, allowing
other businesses to use the institution’s infrastructure and operational
resources to develop their own financial offerings. Saldo Bank could therefore
contribute both to services for the group’s clients and to relationships with
third parties, extending its commercial opportunities beyond the direct
provision of financial products.</p> <h2><strong>Authorizations and European expansion</strong></h2> <p>The acquisition of Saldo Bank would expand Payward’s European operations, which
are organized through several specialized entities. Payward Ireland Limited has
been authorized by the Central Bank of Ireland as an electronic money
institution since 25 September 2023. For investment services governed by MiFID
II, the group operates through Payward Europe Digital Solutions (CY) Limited, a
company first authorized by CySEC on 13 November 2017, whose acquisition was
announced on 3 February 2025. On 25 June 2025, the group also announced Irish
MiCAR authorizations for Payward Europe Solutions Limited and Payward Global
Solutions Limited, covering crypto-asset services and the operation of the
trading platform respectively. Adding Saldo Bank would allow deposit-taking and
lending to sit alongside these activities.</p> <p>Saldo Bank’s banking passport would enable the group to develop its offering
throughout the European Economic Area, either by providing services across
borders or by establishing branches, without obtaining a separate banking
license in each country. The institution already uses this framework to serve
clients in Finland, Sweden and Germany, and is entitled to operate in the
Netherlands. Expansion into additional markets would require the relevant
notifications to supervisory authorities, within the scope of its authorized
activities and subject to applicable local rules. Once the acquisition is
completed, Payward would therefore have a banking platform for further European
expansion. Its actual development would depend on the markets selected, the
services notified and the group’s commercial priorities.</p> <h2><strong>Competition between banks and crypto firms</strong></h2> <p>For many years, some European financial institutions viewed crypto-assets with
skepticism, placing greater emphasis on assessing risks than on exploring
opportunities for growth. Waiting for a harmonized regulatory framework, which
became fully applicable only at the end of 2024 under MiCAR, also contributed to
this cautious approach. Meanwhile, several leading crypto firms broadened their
presence in traditional finance, developing tokenized financial instruments and
obtaining authorizations under MiFID II to expand their investment services.
Payward’s agreement for Saldo Bank takes this process a step further into
deposit-taking and lending. Crypto-native firms have thus moved ahead of part of
the banking sector in the convergence of the two markets, building broader
offerings while several institutions were still assessing how to enter the
crypto market.</p> <p>Several major European banking groups have nevertheless recognized the potential
of crypto-assets and begun integrating them into their services. In Spain, BBVA,
CaixaBank and the Santander group, through Openbank, are entitled to provide
services under MiCAR. In Germany, Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank and DZ BANK have
followed a similar path. In Italy, Banca Sella has completed the notification
process to provide crypto-asset custody and transfer services. This opening
comes, however, as major crypto firms are extending their offerings to more
traditional financial needs. Banks face the risk of losing their role in
managing crypto investors’ assets, as clients could move funds and investments
currently held with traditional institutions to these platforms. A relationship
established to buy bitcoin could evolve to encompass a broader share of a
client’s wealth. Entering the crypto market therefore also matters to banks’
ability to retain their position in these clients’ wider financial lives.</p> <h2><strong>Conclusions</strong></h2> <p>The Saldo Bank agreement gives concrete form to a shift in the role of crypto
firms, which are using the expertise, infrastructure and commercial
relationships developed in their own sector to expand into traditional finance.
Completing the acquisition would allow Payward to extend this process to
deposit-taking and lending, drawing on a client base built through crypto-asset
investment services. For European banks, this development increases the
strategic importance of decisions about entering the sector, including their
ability to retain a central role in managing clients’ wealth. The head start
gained by crypto-native firms must nevertheless translate into successful
integration of banking services and the ability to attract funds currently held
with traditional institutions. Those results will determine the significance of
this convergence, showing how far relationships established in the crypto market
can influence where clients hold their savings and how financial revenues are
distributed.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The US crypto agenda faces delays and uncertainty]]></title>
            <description><![CDATA[<img src="https://www.dgi.io/news-topics/share/regolamentazione.jpg"> Regulation · The legislative impasse and the challenges of implementing the Strategic Bitcoin Reserve]]></description>
            <link>https://www.dgi.io/2026-10-15-us-crypto-agenda-delays/</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dgi.io/2026-10-15-us-crypto-agenda-delays/</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Staff]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 15 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <enclosure url="https://www.dgi.io/news-topics/share/regolamentazione.jpg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On 14 October 2026, the White House confirmed the end of Patrick Witt’s
temporary assignment as executive director of the presidential council for
digital assets and a key coordinator of the Trump administration’s crypto
agenda. According to publicly available information, Witt was the last remaining
staff member, and no successor has been announced. His departure comes at a
significant moment, with the CLARITY Act stalled in the Senate and the Bitcoin
reserve facing operational challenges. The administration’s initiatives follow
distinct institutional paths. The SEC and CFTC continue to act within their
existing powers, while a comprehensive framework for the market requires
congressional approval. Organizational and financial aspects of the Strategic
Bitcoin Reserve also remain unresolved. Witt’s departure therefore introduces
uncertainty over the continuity of coordination between the White House,
regulators and federal departments, without necessarily implying that ongoing
initiatives will be interrupted.</p> <h2><strong>Continuity of federal coordination</strong></h2> <p>Witt served on a temporary assignment from the Department of Defense. His
departure follows those of David Sacks, the president’s adviser on artificial
intelligence and digital assets, in March 2026, and deputy director Harry Jung
in July. Sacks attributed his departure to reaching the service limit applicable
to special government employees. Witt, meanwhile, had postponed a period of
mandatory training with the Georgia National Guard. These successive departures
weaken continuity within the team that engaged with the industry and mediated
legislative negotiations. However, the reasons given for the individual
departures do not support a single political interpretation.</p> <p>The institutional framework remains that established by the executive order of
23 January 2025, which created the President’s Working Group on Digital Asset
Markets within the National Economic Council. Its members include the Treasury,
the Department of Justice, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and other federal bodies. The
executive director coordinates its daily activities without superseding the
responsibilities of its members. Continuity in this role is particularly
relevant to matters involving multiple institutions and requiring agreement
between differing interests. The absence of a publicly announced successor
therefore creates uncertainty over operational coordination at the White House,
while the authorities’ powers continue to rest on their respective mandates.</p> <h2><strong>The CLARITY Act and regulatory initiatives</strong></h2> <p>The Digital Asset Market Clarity Act represents the main effort to establish a
federal framework for digital asset markets by clarifying the division of
responsibilities between the SEC and CFTC. On 15 September 2026, the procedural
motion needed to begin Senate consideration received 49 votes in favor and 50
against, well short of the 60 required. The outcome blocked the bill’s progress
without constituting a final vote on the substance of the reform. Disagreements
remain unresolved over restrictions on public officials’ conflicts of interest,
investor protection, anti-money laundering safeguards and the role of state
authorities in enforcing the rules. Negotiations are further complicated by the
dispute between banks and crypto firms over stablecoin rewards, an issue on
which Witt had acted as a mediator. The debate therefore concerns not only the
allocation of responsibilities but also the independence of oversight and the
effectiveness of investor protection.</p> <p>On the regulatory front, on 1 October the SEC proposed new rules on digital
asset custody for registered investment advisers and regulated funds, allowing,
under specified conditions, self-custody and the use of state-chartered trust
companies. On 5 October, the CFTC launched a preliminary consultation on
leveraged, margined or financed digital asset transactions with retail customers
under the Commodity Exchange Act. Both initiatives address specific aspects of
the framework but require further steps before becoming applicable rules. A
comprehensive federal framework therefore remains dependent on the legislative
process. If the CLARITY Act is not passed before the current Congress ends, it
will need to be reintroduced in the new Congress, which convenes in January
2027, potentially delaying the reform.</p> <h2><strong>Obstacles to the Strategic Bitcoin Reserve</strong></h2> <p>The executive order of 6 March 2025 provided for the Bitcoin reserve to be
funded with bitcoin obtained through final forfeiture and retained as public
assets. It tasked the Treasury and the Department of Commerce with developing
strategies for additional acquisitions that would be budget-neutral and impose
no additional costs on taxpayers. It established neither a purchase schedule nor
dedicated funding. Retaining government-held bitcoin and launching an
accumulation program remain distinct policies. The former changes the management
of existing assets, while the latter can generate new market demand.</p> <p>In July 2026, implementation encountered legal and organizational obstacles.
Uncertainty emerged over the responsibilities of the departments involved and
the legal basis for managing the reserve, with the Department of Commerce
considered as a possible administrator. The White House continued to assess the
operational structure, while an announcement previously anticipated by Witt did
not materialize. These delays highlighted the difficulties of translating
presidential policy into defined responsibilities and procedures. For the
reserve to become a vehicle for accumulation, financing arrangements,
authorizations and implementing rules are needed. Its establishment alone does
not demonstrate that systematic purchases have begun.</p> <h2><strong>Establishing a statutory framework for the reserve</strong></h2> <p>On 16 September 2026, the House Financial Services Committee voted 28–21 to
advance the American Reserve Modernization Act. The substitute text provides for
bitcoin to be held for at least 20 years and for a Proof of Reserve system based
on annual reporting and independent verification. Compared with the original
version, which envisaged quarterly reports, reporting frequency is reduced.
Disclosures cover holdings, transactions and control of private keys. These
requirements would allow periodic monitoring of the reserve’s management and
strengthen transparency. The proposal thus seeks to establish a statutory
framework for oversight of the assets, but committee approval is only one stage
of the legislative process and does not bring the provisions into force.</p> <p>On additional purchases, the text maintains a cautious approach. It calls for
the Treasury and Commerce to conduct a joint study of available strategies,
assessing their costs and benefits, without authorizing new borrowing, new taxes
or deficit spending to purchase bitcoin. The custody framework therefore
proceeds separately from any expansion of the reserve. Strengthening the
institutional framework does not, in itself, entail increased government
purchases. Assessing the scope of federal policy therefore requires
distinguishing between legislative progress, actual authorizations and practical
implementation. A mandate to study options does not amount to a decision to
pursue the strategies examined.</p> <h2><strong>Conclusions</strong></h2> <p>The commitment to establish a Strategic Bitcoin Reserve, announced by Trump in
Nashville in July 2024, was a prominent element of his election campaign
directed at the digital asset industry. More than a year and a half after the
March 2025 executive order, however, the operational structure and arrangements
for potential additional acquisitions remain incomplete. The shift toward
retaining government-held bitcoin is a concrete achievement, but it has not been
accompanied by an additional purchase plan specifying resources, timing and
operational procedures. Witt’s departure adds uncertainty and could complicate
the coordination needed to translate the initiative into concrete measures.
Meanwhile, the continuing work of the SEC and CFTC and progress on
reserve-related proposals confirm that institutional activity is ongoing. The
CLARITY Act’s stalled progress, however, holds back the consolidation of the
broader regulatory framework. A gap therefore remains between political
commitments and their implementation. For financial institutions, assessing the
US agenda will increasingly depend on the administration’s ability to translate
its stated objectives into operational rules, verifiable decisions and concrete
measures.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Digital Gold Institute Quarterly report - Q3 2026]]></title>
            <description><![CDATA[<img src="https://www.dgi.io/analyses/dgi-quarterly-report-2026-q3-en.webp"> Quarterly report · A quarterly analysis of crypto-asset markets, combining quantitative data and indicators with an assessment of key developments across the ecosystem, regulation, and technology.]]></description>
            <link>https://www.dgi.io/analysis-research/#dgi-quarterly-report-2026-q3</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dgi.io/analysis-research/#dgi-quarterly-report-2026-q3</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Digital Gold Institute]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <enclosure url="https://www.dgi.io/analyses/dgi-quarterly-report-2026-q3-en.webp" length="0" type="image/webp"/>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<img src="https://www.dgi.io/analyses/dgi-quarterly-report-2026-q3-en.webp" alt=""><p>A quarterly analysis of crypto-asset markets, combining quantitative data and indicators with an assessment of key developments across the ecosystem, regulation, and technology.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The XRP Ledger flaw that allowed new XRP to be created]]></title>
            <description><![CDATA[<img src="https://www.dgi.io/news-topics/share/tecnologia.jpg"> Technology · Artificial intelligence, latent vulnerabilities and timely remediation]]></description>
            <link>https://www.dgi.io/2026-10-12-xrp-ledger-flaw-new-xrp-creation/</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dgi.io/2026-10-12-xrp-ledger-flaw-new-xrp-creation/</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Staff]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 12 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <enclosure url="https://www.dgi.io/news-topics/share/tecnologia.jpg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The security of a blockchain-based financial infrastructure extends beyond
protecting the keys users rely on to authorize transactions: it also depends on
the software’s ability to enforce the protocol’s rules correctly. An error in
the code used across the network can compromise transaction integrity even when
signatures are valid and checks appear to pass normally. This was the issue
exposed by the vulnerability patched in XRP Ledger in September 2026, which
could have allowed XRP to be created in breach of the rules governing its
supply. The flaw was reproduced in a local environment, with no evidence of
exploitation on the public network. What makes the case particularly significant
is the contribution attributed to artificial intelligence in its discovery: the
ability to uncover vulnerabilities that have remained unnoticed for years also
requires a reassessment of response times. In this setting, security depends as
much on detecting a flaw as on the speed with which it can be verified,
corrected and protected against exploitation.</p> <h2><strong>Supply integrity and the independence of controls</strong></h2> <p>XRP Ledger is a public blockchain whose native asset, XRP, has a defining
characteristic: its initial supply of 100 billion units cannot be increased
through the normal operation of the protocol. Transaction fees also
progressively reduce the total quantity of XRP. The vulnerability, reported on
22 September 2026, undermined this principle. It affected the payment engine,
which can draw on offers in the network’s integrated exchange. When calculating
amounts, the software could exceed the limits of its numerical representation
and return a total lower than the actual amount. The same problem affected the
control responsible for preventing new issuance, allowing it to accept an
incorrect result.</p> <p>In the researchers’ demonstration, a single transaction could generate
approximately 18.45 trillion XRP, more than 184 times the initial supply. This
figure illustrates the vulnerability’s potential scale; it does not imply that
issuance occurred on the public network or that an economic loss was realized.
The presence of the same error in both the payment engine and the supply control
exposes a specific weakness in the protocol’s design: two components with
different responsibilities can fail simultaneously if they share the same
weaknesses. For a financial infrastructure, this makes it essential to examine
how its layers of protection interact and how a single error could affect the
network’s overall operation.</p> <h2><strong>Artificial intelligence and the reassessment of existing software</strong></h2> <p>The flaw in the payment engine dated back to 2015, while the control against new
issuance had been introduced in 2017. Veria Labs, the research team that
reported the vulnerability, attributes the discovery of both problems and their
combination into a local proof of concept to its artificial intelligence agent.
Researchers subsequently reviewed the demonstration. The case shows how these
tools can uncover weaknesses arising from interactions between components
developed at different times. The issue extends beyond blockchains: software
used for decades can also contain vulnerabilities that emerge only under
particular conditions or through a combination of flaws.</p> <p>One example comes from Anthropic, which documented the discovery, using its
Mythos Preview model, of vulnerabilities that had existed for 27 years in the
OpenBSD operating system and for 16 years in the FFmpeg multimedia library. Such
findings show how long weaknesses can remain unnoticed even in widely used
software. For operators of critical infrastructure, this reinforces the
importance of supplementing routine maintenance with deeper periodic reviews.
Artificial intelligence can make a significant contribution to this work, but
its effectiveness also depends on researchers’ ability to confirm findings,
assess their implications and establish the conditions under which a flaw could
be exploited. At the same time, the availability of more powerful tools can
increase the pressure on those protecting systems already in production, making
timely detection and remediation even more important.</p> <h2><strong>Previous cases and the distinction between discovery and prevention</strong></h2> <p>Artificial intelligence has already contributed to the discovery of significant
vulnerabilities in the crypto sector. On 19 February 2026, Pranamya Keshkamat
and Apex, the security tool developed by Cantina AI, discovered an error in the
signature verification logic of XRP Ledger’s Batch feature, designed to group
multiple transactions. The flaw could have allowed transactions to be executed
on behalf of other users without access to their private keys. As the feature
had not yet been activated on the main network, its vulnerable implementation
could be prevented from going live, avoiding exposure for users. Another example
is the research program run by RippleX, the Ripple team dedicated to
developing the protocol and tools for the XRP Ledger ecosystem. The initiative
combines AI-assisted analysis, testing under adverse conditions and human
review, and contributed to fixes included in software version 3.1.3. This
approach shows how such tools can support researchers within a process that
requires technical verification and specialist oversight.</p> <p>Comparison with the arithmetic vulnerability reported in September highlights
two different operational situations. When a flaw is identified before a feature
is activated, it can be corrected before the feature enters use on the public
network, limiting users’ exposure. When the vulnerability affects software
already in operation, however, remediation must take place while the
infrastructure continues to process transactions. Risk management must then
reconcile the speed of remediation, the coordination of upgrades and the
continuity of consensus between nodes. Even a technically effective fix requires
coordinated deployment to limit the risk of divergence in the application of
protocol rules. The ability to respond therefore also depends on how
interventions are organized and whether the network can be protected without
compromising its operation.</p> <h2><strong>Remediation and the network’s exposure window</strong></h2> <p>The vulnerability was reported on 22 September and verified by RippleX
engineers; version 3.4.1 of the xrpld software, developed in collaboration with
the XRP Ledger Foundation, was announced on 25 September. The fix introduces
checks on arithmetic sums and strengthens the control against new issuance.
Changes to transaction processing are normally activated through amendments,
after maintaining support from more than 80% of trusted validators for two
weeks. This procedure allows servers to apply the new rules from the same point
in the ledger. In this case, however, protection took effect on each server as
soon as it was upgraded.</p> <p>Waiting would have prolonged exposure to a flaw that publication of the fix
could have helped reveal; for the same reason, the source code was initially
withheld. During the transition, however, an attempted exploit could have been
accepted by servers running the previous version and rejected by upgraded
servers, causing ledger divergence or a network halt. Ordinary transactions were
unaffected by this difference. The official vulnerability report does not
indicate that this scenario occurred and states that more than 80% of validators
included in the default trusted validator list had upgraded their software on
the day of release. Rapid adoption therefore limited the period during which
versions applying different rules coexisted.</p> <h2><strong>Conclusions</strong></h2> <p>The XRP Ledger case shows how artificial intelligence can accelerate the
discovery of vulnerabilities that have remained unnoticed for years, changing
the security conditions even for infrastructure with a long operating history.
The benefits for defensive research are accompanied by the possibility that the
same advances will allow attackers to identify and exploit flaws more quickly.
Timely action is therefore essential: verifying the report, correcting the
software and ensuring that protection reaches the systems in use. In the XRP
Ledger case, this process addressed a threat to supply integrity without
evidence emerging of exploitation on the public network. As analytical tools
evolve, security increasingly depends on the ability to move quickly from
discovering a vulnerability to effectively containing the risk it creates.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Reverse solicitation and access to the European market]]></title>
            <description><![CDATA[<img src="https://www.dgi.io/news-topics/share/regolamentazione.jpg"> Regulation · The Binance case and the limits of the MiCAR exemption]]></description>
            <link>https://www.dgi.io/2026-10-09-binance-reverse-solicitation-micar/</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dgi.io/2026-10-09-binance-reverse-solicitation-micar/</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Staff]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 09 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <enclosure url="https://www.dgi.io/news-topics/share/regolamentazione.jpg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>MiCAR established a common framework for the authorization and supervision of
crypto-asset service providers in the European Union, replacing the fragmented
national regimes that preceded it. The end of the transitional period completed
this shift, making continued operation subject to the requirements set out in
the regulation. Third-country firms retain a narrow exemption for services
requested at a client’s own exclusive initiative, known as reverse solicitation.
The Binance case concerns the use of this exemption to serve European clients
without MiCAR authorization. Supervisory authorities in France, Germany and
Greece are reportedly examining these arrangements, and some are said to have
requested information on their legal basis. The central question is whether
requests originate independently with clients or follow commercial solicitation
attributable to the provider. This distinction affects both the conditions for
market access and the protections available to clients, which depend on the
regulatory regime applicable to the provider.</p> <h2><strong>Market access after the transitional period</strong></h2> <p>Under the standard regime, access to the European market requires CASP
authorization or, for eligible categories of financial entities, compliance with
Article 60 of MiCAR, which provides for prior notification to the competent
authority. Authorization granted in one Member State enables a provider to
operate throughout the Union, within the scope of its authorized services, using
the cross-border notification procedure under Article 65. Providers must notify
the authority in their home Member State of, among other things, the countries
concerned, the services to be provided and the intended start date. ESMA has set
out an orderly wind-down process for providers that relied on the transitional
regime without securing the regulatory status required to continue, with the aim
of bringing their client relationships to a close. These providers must stop
onboarding new clients in the Union and cease marketing directed at the European
market, restricting services to the transactions needed to sell or transfer
assets and close positions. Custody may continue only for as long as strictly
necessary to complete the exit. The plan must clearly state the timetable and
the deadline for any automatic closure of remaining positions, while anti-money
laundering and transfer traceability obligations continue to apply. This
temporary continuation is intended to protect clients during the wind-down.
Services provided by a third-country firm at a client’s own exclusive initiative
rest on a separate legal basis, subject to the limits of Article 61.</p> <h2><strong>The scope of reverse solicitation</strong></h2> <p>Article 61 exempts a third-country firm from the authorization requirement under
Article 59 when a client established or situated in the Union requests a service
at their own exclusive initiative. The exemption covers the requested service
and the relationship specifically connected to it, without extending to the
firm’s commercial activities as a whole. The exclusive initiative requirement
also applies to business-to-business relationships and is not met if the
provider has solicited the client, directly or through persons acting on its
behalf or having close links with it. The origin of the request must be
established from the facts, which cannot be overridden by contractual clauses or
declarations signed by the client stating that they acted independently. Even
where the request is spontaneous, the firm cannot rely on the exemption to
market new types of crypto-assets or services. The restriction therefore
concerns both the origin of the request and the scope of subsequent marketing.
In assessing whether products are of the same type, ESMA’s guidelines require
consideration of their category and risks. Their availability on the same
platform is not sufficient to establish equivalence.</p> <h2><strong>Assessing the client’s initiative in practice</strong></h2> <p>Applying these criteria requires examining how the firm reaches European clients
and offers them its services. ESMA’s guidelines take a broad view of
solicitation, which may include online advertising, affiliate programs,
sponsorships and influencer marketing, including activities carried out by
affiliated companies or persons acting on the provider’s behalf. General brand
advertising targeting a European audience may also qualify, even without
references to a particular service. The involvement of an EU-regulated
intermediary does not make a request independent if it was solicited on behalf
of a third-country firm. The assessment of promotional activities must also
consider client records, which should allow the origin of requests to be traced,
particularly where they concern new products. The timing of subsequent offers
also matters. Firms may market crypto-assets or services of the same type in the
context of the initial transaction, but a spontaneous first contact does not, in
itself, authorize subsequent commercial solicitation. Assessing Binance’s
reliance on the exemption therefore requires examining client acquisition,
marketing communications and the development of client relationships together,
to determine whether its actual operations remain within the permitted scope.</p> <h2><strong>Supervision and client protection</strong></h2> <p>National authorities are responsible for supervising reliance on reverse
solicitation, conducting investigations and imposing sanctions, while ESMA
promotes cooperation and consistent application of the rules. Binance states
that it complies with applicable rules and is working towards MiCAR
authorization. Stronger supervision of third-country firms also features in
discussions on revising the regulation. In its response to the Commission’s
consultation, published on 30 September 2026, ESMA proposed specific powers to
address firms that solicit investors in the Union without authorization, to
ensure a consistent and narrow interpretation of Article 61. For clients, the
applicable protection regime remains crucial regardless of the outcome of these
inquiries. Even when a service meets the conditions of Article 61, the client
does not benefit from the MiCAR safeguards applicable to relationships with
providers authorized or otherwise entitled to operate under the EU framework.
For custody, Article 75 requires a CASP to segregate clients’ crypto-assets
legally and operationally from its own estate so that, in accordance with
applicable law, its creditors have no recourse to those assets, including in the
event of insolvency. The CASP is also liable for the loss of assets or the means
of access caused by incidents attributable to it, with liability capped at the
assets’ market value at the time of the loss. The choice of provider therefore
also determines the liability framework within which clients can enforce their
rights.</p> <h2><strong>Conclusions</strong></h2> <p>The central question in the Binance case is whether the firm’s European
operations remain within an exemption based on clients’ independent requests or
amount to a commercial offering directed at the Union. Article 61 covers the
requested service and the client relationship specifically linked to it, but
does not grant a general right to acquire clients and grow a European client
base. If the exemption covered activities promoted in the European market, it
would allow firms to compete with CASPs without assuming their obligations,
while leaving clients without the corresponding MiCAR safeguards. The issue
therefore concerns both competitive conditions and the allocation of risks and
responsibilities in client relationships. To establish whether these limits are
respected, authorities must assess the promotional activities and services
provided by the entities involved as a whole, even where those entities operate
across several countries. The purpose of coordinating supervision is to prevent
divergent interpretations of Article 61 from producing different regulatory
outcomes for the same business model and undermining uniform conditions for
market access.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[FTX: Investment returns and creditor protection]]></title>
            <description><![CDATA[<img src="https://www.dgi.io/news-topics/share/ecosistema.jpg"> Ecosystem · The Anthropic case and asset management in insolvency proceedings]]></description>
            <link>https://www.dgi.io/2026-10-05-ftx-anthropic-returns-creditors/</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dgi.io/2026-10-05-ftx-anthropic-returns-creditors/</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Staff]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 05 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <enclosure url="https://www.dgi.io/news-topics/share/ecosistema.jpg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In the years preceding its bankruptcy in November 2022, FTX and Alameda Research
had built an extensive portfolio of stakes in private companies, fund
investments, loans and crypto-assets. Some of these investments had been
financed through the unlawful use of customer funds, a central element of the
fraud for which Sam Bankman-Fried was convicted. Once insolvency proceedings
began, the assets came under the control of the administrators responsible for
recovering funds and organizing repayments to creditors. In the following years,
asset recovery was shaped by market developments and the growth of some of the
companies in the portfolio, making decisions on whether to retain or sell
investments an important part of the administration of the estate.</p> <p>The stake in Anthropic provides an opportunity to examine these issues together.
In 2022, the FTX group invested $500 million in the company, subsequently
selling its entire holding in 2024 for approximately $1.34 billion. In May 2026,
Anthropic raised $65 billion at a post-money valuation of $965 billion. Its
growth following the sale has renewed interest in the original investment and
the circumstances of its disposal. Between the acquisition and the latest
valuations, however, the company raised further capital, ownership percentages
changed and the shares passed to new investors. Reconstructing this sequence
makes it possible to assess the profitability of the initial investment, the
evolution of the holding’s value and the discretion available to the estate,
taking into account both the prospects for asset appreciation and obligations
towards creditors.</p> <h2><strong>The investment and its sale</strong></h2> <p>In April 2022, the FTX group invested $500 million in Anthropic as part of a
$580 million funding round. The investment was made through an affiliate of
Alameda Research, the crypto-asset trading and investment firm founded by
Bankman-Fried and closely connected to FTX. The initial holding represented
13.56% of the company’s equity on a fully diluted basis. When FTX and Alameda
entered US Chapter 11 proceedings in November 2022, the Anthropic shares became
part of the assets to be managed to recover funds for creditors.</p> <p>By January 2024, following further funding rounds at Anthropic, the group’s
stake had fallen to 7.84%, representing relative dilution of approximately 42%
from the initial holding. On 29 February 2024, the court authorized the sale of
the shares, approving procedures that allowed the disposal to be divided into
several transactions and its timing to be adjusted. The court documents
therefore establish authorization to sell, rather than an obligation to dispose
of the holding immediately. The sale subsequently took place in two
transactions. On 22 March 2024, a proposal was filed to sell approximately 29.5
million shares, representing around two-thirds of FTX’s holding, for $884
million. On 31 May 2024, a proposal was filed for the remaining approximately 15
million shares, for a further $452 million. Both transactions provided for a
price of $30 per share. Completion of the two sales marked FTX’s full exit from
Anthropic and generated total proceeds of approximately $1.34 billion,
equivalent to 2.7 times the initial investment.</p> <h2><strong>The FTX and Alameda portfolio</strong></h2> <p>At the time of the bankruptcy in November 2022, FTX and Alameda’s venture
capital portfolio comprised 438 positions, representing approximately $4.5
billion in invested capital. The portfolio review submitted to the court in
September 2023 included equity stakes, fund investments, tokens and loans, while
excluding certain holdings owned by entities outside the proceedings. Among the
largest positions were Genesis Digital Assets, with approximately $1.15 billion
invested, and Anthropic, with $500 million. The initial asset disposals produced
mixed results: by 31 August 2023, sales and agreements covering 22 positions had
generated proceeds of $588 million against invested capital of $673 million,
corresponding to a reported recovery of 87%. This figure covered a limited
portion of the portfolio and preceded the Anthropic sale; it therefore cannot be
interpreted as a measure of the overall profitability of the investments.</p> <p>Individual transactions confirm the variation in outcomes. In April 2023, Mysten
Labs repurchased the equity stake and rights to purchase SUI tokens for
approximately $96 million. The group had acquired them for around $102 million,
resulting in a modest nominal loss relative to the capital invested. In May of
the same year, LedgerX was sold for approximately $50 million, against an
acquisition cost approaching $300 million in 2021, with a reported loss of
around $250 million. In August 2023, Robinhood repurchased shares seized by the
US authorities for approximately $606 million; the transaction proceeds alone,
however, do not establish the return on the original investment. In 2024, the
two Anthropic sales generated total proceeds of approximately $1.34 billion,
with published reports indicating a gain of around $800 million before the costs
of the proceedings. In April of the same year, the sale of a tranche of SOL
generated proceeds of between $1.6 billion and $1.9 billion, without a publicly
disclosed gain or loss measured against the original cost of the tokens sold.
Those tokens were also subject to restrictions on availability extending over
the following four years. Overall, the portfolio shows varied results:
substantial returns on some holdings, significant losses on others, and
transactions for which public information establishes the proceeds received but
does not allow the full investment return to be reconstructed.</p> <h2><strong>The value of the holding after dilution</strong></h2> <p>Estimating the value that FTX’s former holding might have reached requires
accounting for the effects of Anthropic’s subsequent capital increases. Applying
the 7.84% stake held in January 2024 to a hypothetical valuation of $2 trillion
ahead of a possible public listing produces a theoretical value of $156.8
billion. This estimate nevertheless assumes that the percentage held in January
2024 remained unchanged, without accounting for subsequent changes in the
ownership structure. A reliable valuation would require reconstructing changes
in the company’s capital, any conversions of financial instruments, the rights
attached to the shares and the restrictions on transferring the holding. It
would also be necessary to distinguish valuations established in completed
funding rounds from market expectations and to account for any additional
investment required to maintain the 7.84% stake. Without sufficient public
information, the figure represents a simplified counterfactual scenario rather
than a verified measure of the value FTX would have retained. Anthropic’s growth
therefore indicates a potential opportunity cost associated with the sale, but
that cost cannot be quantified solely by reference to subsequent valuations.</p> <h2><strong>Creditor repayments and the comparison with Mt. Gox</strong></h2> <p>The assessment of creditor repayments also depends on the benchmark used. For
the July 2026 distribution, FTX reported cumulative recoveries of 105% for the
main customer classes and 120% for the convenience class of smaller claims.
These percentages are calculated against allowed claims denominated in dollars,
based on the values recognized at the time of the bankruptcy in November 2022.
Repayment exceeding 100% of an allowed claim does not, however, amount to the
return of the same quantity of crypto-assets originally deposited, nor does it
fully capture the economic cost of their unavailability during the proceedings.
Recovery can therefore exceed the nominal value of the recognized claim while
remaining below the value the assets would have reached had they remained
available to the customer. These are distinct benchmarks, both relevant to
assessing the economic outcome of the proceedings.</p> <p>The Mt. Gox case illustrates this distinction. The Japanese bitcoin exchange,
which failed in 2014, entered civil rehabilitation proceedings in June 2018.
This suspended the bankruptcy proceedings and allowed bitcoin-denominated claims
to be preserved without conversion into monetary claims at the outset of the new
process. By 24 July 2024, repayments in bitcoin and bitcoin cash had been made
to more than 17,000 creditors through the direct distribution of some of the
available crypto-assets. For this portion of the repayments, the economic value
received by creditors reflected asset prices at the time of distribution and
therefore incorporated the appreciation that had occurred during the
proceedings. The comparison with FTX shows how the extent to which an allowed
claim is satisfied can differ from the creditor’s actual economic recovery: a
payment exceeding the recognized dollar claim may still fall below the market
value of the crypto-assets originally deposited.</p> <h2><strong>Conclusions</strong></h2> <p>The Anthropic investment proved particularly profitable, generating proceeds of
approximately $1.34 billion against an initial investment of $500 million. The
company’s subsequent growth makes a substantially higher potential value for the
former holding plausible, but dilution in later years prevents that value from
being estimated by applying current valuations directly to the historical
ownership percentage. The realized return is therefore documented, while the
opportunity cost of the sale remains uncertain.</p> <p>The FTX case also highlights the difference between monetary repayment of claims
and the return of the crypto-assets originally deposited. Dollar repayments
measured against claims recognized at the bankruptcy date can satisfy an allowed
claim in full without compensating for the appreciation those assets would have
recorded had they remained available to customers, as the comparison with Mt.
Gox illustrates. Assessing the outcome of the proceedings therefore requires
distinguishing investment returns, the potential value of assets and creditors’
economic recovery.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Digital Gold Institute Monthly report - September 2026]]></title>
            <description><![CDATA[<img src="https://www.dgi.io/analyses/dgi-monthly-report-2026-09-en.webp"> Monthly report · A monthly analysis of crypto-asset markets, combining quantitative data and indicators with an assessment of key developments across the ecosystem, regulation, and technology.]]></description>
            <link>https://www.dgi.io/analysis-research/#dgi-monthly-report-2026-09</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dgi.io/analysis-research/#dgi-monthly-report-2026-09</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Digital Gold Institute]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <enclosure url="https://www.dgi.io/analyses/dgi-monthly-report-2026-09-en.webp" length="0" type="image/webp"/>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<img src="https://www.dgi.io/analyses/dgi-monthly-report-2026-09-en.webp" alt=""><p>A monthly analysis of crypto-asset markets, combining quantitative data and indicators with an assessment of key developments across the ecosystem, regulation, and technology.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Pontes goes live as Europe’s infrastructure for tokenized finance]]></title>
            <description><![CDATA[<img src="https://www.dgi.io/news-topics/share/regolamentazione.jpg"> Regulation · The Eurosystem connects DLT platforms to central bank money]]></description>
            <link>https://www.dgi.io/2026-09-29-pontes-launch-tokenised-finance/</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dgi.io/2026-09-29-pontes-launch-tokenised-finance/</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Staff]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <enclosure url="https://www.dgi.io/news-topics/share/regolamentazione.jpg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On 21 September 2026, the Eurosystem launched Pontes, a solution that allows
transactions in tokenized assets to be settled in central bank money in Europe’s
wholesale markets. The launch responds to a need identified during the 2024
trials, when market participants said that access to a settlement asset free
from the credit risk of a private issuer was essential to the market’s
development. Thirteen market participants, including Deutsche Bank, Santander,
Société Générale and the European Investment Bank, and four DLT platform
operators had completed onboarding by the launch date; the Deutsche Bundesbank
had also joined as a market participant. On the same day, the European Central
Bank (ECB) announced preparatory work to invest a small portion of its own funds
in tokenized securities, with transactions to be settled through Pontes.</p> <p>For a seller, the safety of a transaction depends both on the coordination of
delivery and payment and on the nature of the money received. Stablecoins and
tokenized deposits may be used in these emerging markets, but they are
liabilities of private issuers and carry risks linked to those issuers’ ability
to meet their obligations. Pontes makes central bank money available to DLT
platforms. It remains the benchmark settlement asset for wholesale transactions
because its value does not depend on the solvency of a commercial bank or token
issuer. Market platforms can therefore adopt tokenization while retaining access
to the money used for final settlement between financial institutions.</p> <h2><strong>How Pontes works</strong></h2> <p>Pontes connects DLT platforms to TARGET Services, the Eurosystem’s
infrastructure for payments, securities settlement and collateral management.
T2, one of those services, is the system in which participants settle payments
in central bank money in real time. When a bond is transferred on a distributed
ledger, its delivery must be coordinated with payment even if the two take place
on separate systems. Delivery versus payment is an established principle in
conventional infrastructure, including TARGET2-Securities, the Eurosystem’s
securities settlement platform. Pontes extends it to transactions involving
market DLT platforms and Eurosystem systems.</p> <p>The initial solution gives participants two ways to settle the cash leg in
central bank money. They can use cash tokens on a DLT platform operated by the
Eurosystem, moving liquidity from their T2 accounts into dedicated wallets, or
settle the payment directly on their T2 accounts. The first option provides a
tokenized representation of liquidity for use during the operating day; the
second connects the platform holding the security directly to T2 cash accounts.
In both cases, legal finality for the cash leg remains anchored in T2 during the
initial phase. With cash tokens, the corresponding movement on T2 accounts takes
place when liquidity is transferred back from the dedicated wallets or at the
end of the business day.</p> <p>Pontes uses the Hash-Link protocol to coordinate the two legs of the
transaction. The market platform locks the transfer of the security and releases
it to the buyer only when payment in central bank money has been confirmed; if
payment fails, the security is not delivered. The DLT platform holding the
security applies its own rules to determine when the asset transfer becomes
final, while Pontes governs settlement of the cash leg. Synchronization enables
delivery versus payment across separate infrastructures, provided their
operational and legal rules are compatible.</p> <p>Tokenization can simplify the lifecycle of a financial instrument by bringing
issuance, trading, settlement, custody and servicing closer together and
automating some processes that currently rely on separate systems. Connecting
those activities to payments in central bank money addresses one of the
constraints identified in the trials, without requiring the securities and the
money to reside on the same platform.</p> <h2><strong>Who can use Pontes</strong></h2> <p>Pontes is designed for wholesale transactions, so market participants must have
access to T2 under the TARGET Services rules. Eligible platform operators
include authorized central securities depositories, operators of settlement
systems or trading and settlement systems authorized under the EU’s DLT Pilot
Regime, overseen payment system operators established in the EU or European
Economic Area, and central counterparties authorized under the European Market
Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR). Banks, investment firms, market operators and
other licensed financial institutions may also qualify if they are subject to
specific supervision as market infrastructures or are assessed individually by
the relevant national central bank. The thirteen participants and four DLT
operators onboarded at launch form the service’s initial group of users. Access
remains limited to eligible institutions; Pontes does not introduce a new means
of payment for the public.</p> <h2><strong>The ECB prepares to invest in tokenized securities</strong></h2> <p>By beginning preparations to buy tokenized securities, the ECB has added the
prospect of using Pontes as an investor to the launch of the settlement service.
Purchases would account for a small portion of its own funds portfolio and would
initially focus on euro-denominated securities issued by euro area governments,
public agencies and European supranational institutions. The portfolio is
separate from monetary policy, and the transactions would be settled in central
bank money through Pontes. The ECB aims to gain experience across the investment
process, from trade execution and settlement to systems and portfolio
management. Its Executive Board will decide the operational details and timing
after the preparatory work, taking account of the supply of eligible tokenized
securities.</p> <p>If the ECB becomes a buyer, its participation could help address a familiar
challenge for emerging markets: issuers need investors and usable
infrastructure, while investors need securities to buy, clear rules and
sufficient liquidity. A small allocation would not, on its own, create regular
trading between market participants. Since 30 March 2026, the Eurosystem has
also accepted certain securities issued through DLT-based services at central
securities depositories as collateral, subject to its existing eligibility
rules. For now, these securities must be available for settlement in eligible
systems accessible through TARGET2-Securities; broader acceptance of assets
issued and settled entirely on other networks remains under review. The
settlement service, the ECB’s possible role as an investor and collateral
eligibility thus address different parts of the same market.</p> <h2><strong>The limits of the initial phase</strong></h2> <p>According to the ECB’s operational documentation, Pontes initially follows the
T2 business calendar: preparatory activities run from 08:00 to 09:00, and
transaction settlement is available from 09:00 to 16:00. This window limits the
continuous use of technology that could operate beyond the banking day, while
legal finality for the cash leg on the Eurosystem DLT platform still depends on
the corresponding movement in T2. The ECB plans to expand Pontes’s functions and
operating hours gradually, with full implementation expected by 2028. Continuous
availability and greater programmability of central bank money therefore remain
for later stages.</p> <p>For connections between infrastructures to support an integrated market,
securities must be issued, held and transferred under compatible rules, with
investors’ rights remaining clear as assets move between platforms. The market
also needs liquidity providers, workable collateral arrangements and certainty
about when transfers become final. Pontes addresses settlement in central bank
money, but transaction volumes will also depend on the growth of issuance and
the development of these other parts of the market.</p> <h2><strong>The path to Appia</strong></h2> <p>Experience with Pontes will feed into Appia, the Eurosystem program examining
how tokenized platforms could operate within an integrated European market. The
options under consideration include a shared network and multiple interoperable
ledgers. Either approach will need common rules for transferring securities and
the rights attached to them between platforms, managing collateral and ensuring
settlement finality. Appia is expected to deliver a broader blueprint by 2028,
informed by problems encountered in the use of Pontes. The choices made for the
longer-term architecture will, in turn, guide the service’s evolution.</p> <h2><strong>Conclusions</strong></h2> <p>Pontes gives financial institutions a way to settle transactions in central bank
money without requiring cash and securities to be held on the same platform. Its
availability, however, says little about how much it will be used or whether the
benefits will justify changes to market infrastructure. Initial onboarding shows
interest; sustained issuance, settlement volumes and trading liquidity will show
whether the connection can support a self-sustaining market. The first test is
whether a working infrastructure becomes part of regular market activity, while
Appia will need to address the problems Pontes leaves open when securities move
between platforms.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[MiCAR, new stablecoin rules under consideration]]></title>
            <description><![CDATA[<img src="https://www.dgi.io/news-topics/share/regolamentazione.jpg"> Regulation · Bank deposit requirements could give way to liquidity-based criteria]]></description>
            <link>https://www.dgi.io/2026-09-24-micar-stablecoin-reserves/</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dgi.io/2026-09-24-micar-stablecoin-reserves/</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Staff]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 24 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <enclosure url="https://www.dgi.io/news-topics/share/regolamentazione.jpg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As part of the consultation launched by the European Commission on the review of
MiCAR, the European System of Central Banks has proposed removing the
requirement for stablecoin issuers to hold at least 30% of their reserves with
EU banks, or 60% for tokens classified as significant. The paper instead
advocates requirements calibrated to the actual liquidity of reserve assets,
with a substantial share capable of being converted into cash within one or five
business days. The aim is to reduce the direct link between issuers and the
banking system, limiting the risk that concentrated redemption requests trigger
rapid outflows from the banks holding those deposits. The effects would be most
pronounced for large global operators. Tether, the world’s largest stablecoin
issuer, has opted not to seek MiCAR authorization partly because of this
requirement. The company has defended its position by pointing to the risks that
bank exposure creates for customers. Although Tether has not cited it as an
official reason, the rule would also weigh on its profitability, since its
business model relies heavily on income generated by reserves invested in US
Treasury securities.</p> <h2><strong>The proposed reserve framework</strong></h2> <p>The prudential rationale behind the proposal lies in the effects that issuer
deposits can have on bank funding. Unlike relatively stable retail deposits,
these funds are more sensitive to market conditions because they fluctuate with
stablecoin issuance and redemptions. During periods of heavy redemption demand,
an issuer may need to withdraw large sums at short notice, placing pressure on
the deposit-taking bank if those funds account for a significant share of its
funding base. The proposed framework builds on thresholds developed by the
European Banking Authority. For significant tokens, at least 40% of reserves
would need to be available within one business day and 60% within five business
days. For other tokens, the corresponding thresholds would be 20% and 30%.
Short-dated government securities and overnight secured transactions could meet
these requirements while giving issuers access to assets that can be mobilized
quickly.</p> <h2><strong>The Tether case and the bank deposit requirement</strong></h2> <p>The deposit requirement forms part of MiCAR’s broader safeguarding regime for
issuers of e-money tokens, which must protect the funds they receive and keep
them segregated from their own assets. The higher threshold applies when a token
is classified as significant, based in part on the number of holders, market
capitalization and transaction volumes. For Tether, compliance would have
required shifting a substantial share of its reserves from short-dated US
Treasury securities into bank deposits, affecting both its asset allocation and
profitability. Paolo Ardoino, Tether’s chief executive, has repeatedly
criticized this approach, arguing that EU deposit guarantee protection is capped
at €100,000 per depositor and that any amount above this threshold remains
exposed to the bank’s credit risk. The Circle case illustrates that risk. When
Silicon Valley Bank failed in March 2023, Circle temporarily lost access to $3.3
billion of USDC reserves, causing the stablecoin to briefly lose its peg to the
dollar. Tether therefore chose not to seek authorization under MiCAR.</p> <h2><strong>Liquidity risk across banks and markets</strong></h2> <p>Issuer objections and the central banks’ analysis begin with the same mismatch.
Stablecoin holders expect to redeem their tokens at any time, while cash
deposited with a bank becomes part of the institution’s broader balance-sheet
management and may not be immediately available to the same extent. The
disagreement concerns which risk each side seeks to contain. From an issuer’s
perspective, bank deposits create exposure to the creditworthiness and liquidity
of the institutions holding them. From the perspective of the European System of
Central Banks, they expose banks to a more volatile source of funding, one that
is sensitive to conditions in crypto-asset markets and potentially vulnerable to
sudden withdrawals. Government securities held separately from an intermediary’s
assets can reduce counterparty risk, but forced sales during a run on
redemptions could transmit stress to the bond market. Replacing the deposit
thresholds would therefore require concentration limits, diversification
criteria and maturity profiles aligned with redemption timelines. Under this
approach, prudential safeguards would rest on the liquidity of the reserves,
their distribution across instruments and counterparties, and their ability to
withstand a period of market stress.</p> <h2><strong>Global issuance and reserve coverage</strong></h2> <p>Revising the reserve requirements leaves a separate issue unresolved for global
issuers: the same token may be issued through a company established in the
European Union and one or more entities based in third countries. Because all
units are fungible, a holder could ask the European entity to redeem tokens
originally issued elsewhere. Reserves held in the Union could therefore end up
covering liabilities created in other jurisdictions, potentially leaving
insufficient resources for European holders during a crisis. MiCAR governs
arrangements among issuers established within the Union but does not cover
structures involving non-EU entities. The European System of Central Banks is
therefore calling for legislative action and, should such models be permitted,
third-country equivalence requirements, cooperation between supervisory
authorities and safeguards ensuring that European reserves remain available
during periods of stress. Access to the EU market would consequently continue to
depend on authorization within the Union and the adoption of a structure
compatible with these rules.</p> <h2><strong>The broader framework remains restrictive</strong></h2> <p>Although the proposal to revise the deposit requirement addresses one of the
issuers’ main concerns, the paper as a whole points to tighter rules and
supervision across other parts of the market. The European System of Central
Banks recommends retaining the ban on stablecoin remuneration and extending it
to indirect rewards offered through lending or staking services, fee discounts
and loyalty programs. It also calls for a common EU framework for staking and
crypto-asset lending and borrowing, based on the economic substance of each
service and the risk assumed by the intermediary toward the customer. Further
action would define the criteria under which a decentralized finance service can
be considered fully decentralized and therefore fall outside MiCAR. For tokens
pegged to foreign currencies, the paper proposes more effective enforcement of
the issuance limits that apply when their use as a means of payment exceeds
certain thresholds. Finally, it supports transferring responsibility for the
authorization, supervision and oversight of crypto-asset service providers from
national authorities to ESMA.</p> <h2><strong>Conclusions</strong></h2> <p>The proposal from the European System of Central Banks opens the way for a
recalibration of MiCAR. Removing the 30% and 60% thresholds would give issuers
greater flexibility in managing their reserves, alongside liquidity,
diversification and concentration requirements designed to contain risks to
banks and financial markets. Issuers and central banks agree on the need to
reconsider the current requirement, although their priorities differ. Issuers
want to reduce their exposure to credit institutions and protect the economic
sustainability of their business models, while central banks are focused on the
stability of bank funding and the consequences of a run on redemptions. The
process will nevertheless take time. The current thresholds will remain in force
until the regulation is amended, and the Commission is required to present its
report by 30 June 2027. Any legislative change would then need to be approved by
the European Parliament and the Council. For global issuers, questions
surrounding EU authorization and the issuance of the same token across multiple
jurisdictions will also remain unresolved. Under the framework set out in the
paper, stablecoins retain a complementary role, while central bank money remains
the anchor of the settlement system. Their place in the European market will
depend on the soundness of their reserves and operating structures, as well as
their ability to comply with the rules across borders.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Revolut case at the intersection of traceability and privacy]]></title>
            <description><![CDATA[<img src="https://www.dgi.io/news-topics/share/istituzioni-finanziarie.jpg"> Financial institutions · When personal data turns on-chain wealth into a target]]></description>
            <link>https://www.dgi.io/2026-09-18-revolut-monero-ransom/</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dgi.io/2026-09-18-revolut-monero-ransom/</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Staff]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 18 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <enclosure url="https://www.dgi.io/news-topics/share/istituzioni-finanziarie.jpg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In September 2026, Revolut disclosed a personal data breach affecting
approximately 700 customers. According to available reports, the attackers used
a certified email account linked to the Prefecture of Reggio Calabria to pose as
officers from Italy’s Postal Police. Through a series of requests, they obtained
identity documents, contact details and transaction histories. The group
iamnotavillain, which claimed responsibility for the operation, subsequently
demanded a ransom of $3 million in monero, threatening to sell the information
to other criminal organizations. The available information does not point to a
breach of custody systems or to any unauthorized transfer of funds: the value of
the attack lies in the stolen data and in the uses it can enable.</p> <p>What initially appeared to be a serious but contained data breach gradually
revealed a deeper connection with the crypto-asset sector. According to the
attackers, the customers were not selected at random but identified through
blockchain analysis based on the holdings associated with them. When the ransom
was demanded, however, the group chose monero rather than bitcoin. For those
familiar with how crypto-assets operate, the decision is unsurprising: bitcoin’s
public and permanent transaction record makes it ill-suited to concealing the
movement of funds over time. The Revolut case therefore provides a particularly
clear lens through which to distinguish public perceptions of crypto-assets from
the actual characteristics of different protocols.</p> <h2>From on-chain analysis to customer identification</h2> <p>According to iamnotavillain’s account to the Financial Times, the approximately
700 customers were selected through on-chain analysis based on the crypto-asset
holdings associated with their accounts. The group nevertheless declined to
explain its methodology, and the available information does not establish which
addresses, transactions or other data were used as a starting point. This
distinction is important because a public blockchain makes transfers observable
but does not record the identities of the people involved or reveal the balance
held in an account with an intermediary. In a custodial service, moreover,
addresses may be controlled by the operator and used on behalf of multiple
customers, making it impossible to attribute an individual position on the basis
of on-chain data alone.</p> <p>A technically plausible reconstruction can nevertheless outline how the process
may have unfolded. Starting with addresses attributed to Revolut’s
infrastructure, the attackers could have traced incoming and outgoing flows,
identified high-value transactions and examined the external addresses involved.
Clustering techniques can then identify groups of addresses that exhibit signs
of common control, without revealing the identity of the person behind them.
Linking an address to an individual necessarily requires information from
outside the blockchain. In this case, the requests submitted to Revolut may have
served precisely this purpose, allowing a particular address or transaction to
be matched with data held in the intermediary’s systems. Revolut states that,
when applying the Travel Rule, it retains information about the originator and
beneficiary together with the transaction identifier. Through repeated requests,
the attackers may therefore have converted an initial selection based on public
flows into profiles containing identities, contact details, documents and
transaction histories.</p> <h2>The criminal value of the stolen data</h2> <p>The value of the dataset does not depend on the presence of login credentials,
private keys or other information that would allow the crypto-assets to be
transferred directly. Revolut has stated that neither its systems nor customer
funds were compromised. The risk instead arises from the combination of
identities, contact details, documents and transaction histories, which can be
used to build highly detailed personal and financial profiles. By referring to
genuine transactions, an attacker could impersonate Revolut or another
intermediary, claim that an account has been compromised and induce the victim
to transfer crypto-assets to a purportedly secure wallet, visit a fraudulent
website or disclose authentication codes and recovery phrases.</p> <p>The combination of a telephone number and identity data may also facilitate SIM
swapping, whereby a criminal transfers the victim’s number to a SIM card under
their control in order to intercept codes sent by text message and attempt to
reset access to email accounts, crypto-asset trading platforms and other
financial services. Copies of identity documents may also be used in attempts to
open accounts with other providers and use them to receive or transfer illicit
funds. The most serious risk, however, arises when a home address is linked to
presumed crypto-asset holdings, enabling criminals to select victims for
extortion, home invasions or kidnappings intended to force a transfer.
Chainalysis has identified the circulation of datasets containing names,
addresses and crypto-asset holdings as one possible factor behind the increase
in physical attacks recorded in France, illustrating how a data breach can
create a threat to personal safety long after the original incident.</p> <h2>The ransom demand and the choice of monero</h2> <p>Possession of such sensitive information gave the group the leverage to attempt
to extort Revolut. On 16 September, iamnotavillain published a demand for 6,000
XMR, approximately $3 million, giving the bank 24 hours to pay before putting
the documents up for sale. The following day, Revolut stated that it had
received no direct communication from the group. The publication of the
ultimatum is therefore documented, but there is no evidence that negotiations
began or that the ransom was paid.</p> <p>The choice of monero is consistent with this extortion strategy. Privacy is not
an optional feature but a property built into the protocol and enabled by
default. Stealth addresses generate a different destination for each payment,
ring signatures make it harder for an outside observer to identify the actual
sender, and Ring Confidential Transactions conceal the amount transferred. The
network can therefore verify the validity of a transaction without making its
essential details publicly visible. This architecture makes monero particularly
suited to situations in which the objective is to limit the reconstruction of
financial flows through blockchain analysis.</p> <p>The same characteristics are, however, driving its gradual exclusion from
regulated markets. From 10 July 2027, Regulation (EU) 2024/1624 will prohibit
credit institutions, financial institutions and crypto-asset service providers
from maintaining accounts that allow the identity of the holder to be anonymized
or transactions to be further obfuscated, including through anonymity-enhancing
coins. The new framework will therefore sharply restrict the availability of
monero trading and custody services from regulated intermediaries in the
European Union. The provision does not impose a general ban on holding or using
the protocol, but it will substantially reduce access through Europe’s regulated
financial infrastructure.</p> <h2>The gap between perception and evidence</h2> <p>A ransom demand in monero may appear counterintuitive to those viewing the
sector from the outside. In the public imagination, crypto-asset extortion is
still associated almost automatically with bitcoin, a perception formed during
its early adoption, when its use in illicit online marketplaces helped shape its
public image. This legacy has encouraged the belief that bitcoin provides
anonymity and is therefore the most effective instrument for concealing illicit
proceeds. The protocol operates differently: transactions are pseudonymous, but
they remain public and permanently recorded. Once an address is linked to an
individual or a service, its transaction history can be reconstructed even years
later. For anyone seeking to conceal the movement of funds over time, this
persistence represents a structural constraint.</p> <p>The composition of illicit flows also challenges the automatic association
between bitcoin and criminal activity. According to Chainalysis’s 2026 Crypto
Crime Report, addresses associated with illicit activity received at least $154
billion in 2025, a figure driven largely by flows involving sanctioned entities.
Stablecoins accounted for 84% of the illicit volume identified, while illicit
activity represented less than 1% of the total volume attributed by the company.
These estimates are revised as new illicit addresses are identified and do not
capture every form of criminal activity. They nevertheless show that illicit
flows are not concentrated in bitcoin and that the choice of instrument depends
on the requirements of each operation.</p> <h2>Security beyond custody</h2> <p>For intermediaries, the Revolut case shows that the security of crypto-asset
services cannot be confined to protecting private keys and custody
infrastructure. When held directly, crypto-assets can resemble digital bearer
instruments: anyone who gains control of the private keys, or induces the holder
to authorize a transfer, can move the value without an ordinary mechanism for
recalling the transaction. Identity documents, contact details, holdings and
transaction histories can therefore become a map of potential targets,
particularly when combined with information observable on the blockchain.
Controls must consequently extend to verifying requests from public authorities,
segregating access rights, minimizing the data disclosed and detecting repeated
or anomalous requests. The available information does not indicate that
Revolut’s custody systems were compromised. The risk that emerged instead
concerns the operational processes through which external parties may gain
access to customer data.</p> <p>For holders of substantial crypto-asset wealth, the choice of intermediary
should therefore depend not only on financial soundness, the range of services
offered and the measures used to safeguard assets, but also on the ability to
protect information revealing the existence and scale of those holdings. The
fact that the incident involved an organization as established as Revolut does
not demonstrate that the intermediary was unprepared. It instead shows that
residual risk remains even within mature organizations and may be concentrated
in operational processes rather than technological infrastructure.</p> <h2>Conclusions</h2> <p>The Revolut case shows that crypto-asset security extends beyond custody.
Information linking an identity to financial holdings and transactions can
itself become an instrument of attack. The most significant feature of the case
lies in the asymmetry between on-chain transparency, which was allegedly used to
select potential targets, and the privacy sought through monero to receive the
ransom. This dynamic also exposes the limits of the association between bitcoin
and criminal activity, as different protocols offer markedly different levels of
traceability. Intermediaries must therefore extend protection to the processes
governing access to and disclosure of customer data, while customers should
consider the ability to safeguard this information when selecting a provider.
Without implying any broader judgment about Revolut’s reliability, the incident
demonstrates that data protection is an integral component of financial
security.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Zcash and the rebuilding of credibility]]></title>
            <description><![CDATA[<img src="https://www.dgi.io/news-topics/share/ecosistema.jpg"> Ecosystem · From the Orchard vulnerability to renewed financial interest in ZEC]]></description>
            <link>https://www.dgi.io/2026-09-15-zcash-rebuilding-credibility/</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dgi.io/2026-09-15-zcash-rebuilding-credibility/</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Staff]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 15 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <enclosure url="https://www.dgi.io/news-topics/share/ecosistema.jpg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Between late June and early September, the price of ZEC tripled, rising from
approximately $400 to more than $1,200 and crossing the $1,000 threshold for the
first time since 2016. The significance of the move lies not only in its
magnitude, but above all in the conditions from which it began. Just a few weeks
earlier, the disclosure of a critical vulnerability in the Orchard shielded pool
had triggered a decline of approximately 40% and cast doubt on the integrity of
the supply. For a crypto-asset with a maximum supply capped at 21 million units,
the possible creation of ZEC in excess of the legitimate supply directly
threatened the monetary rule underpinning the asset’s scarcity. At that stage,
many market participants regarded the investment case as fundamentally
compromised. The subsequent rally also began before bitcoin accelerated, a
sequence that prevents it from being attributed to a simple spillover from the
broader market.</p> <p>The measures adopted contained the potential consequences of any exploitation of
the vulnerability and strengthened the future verifiability of the supply.
Against this new backdrop, renewed interest in privacy-focused crypto-assets
supported demand for ZEC, while the Grayscale ETF broadened the available
channels for gaining exposure. Finally, the growth of derivatives accelerated
the transmission of new flows into the price. The convergence of these factors
helps explain the magnitude of the move, without providing certainty as to the
sustainability of the levels reached.</p> <h2>The economic value of privacy</h2> <p>On most public blockchains, transaction histories remain visible and can be
reconstructed over time through addresses, amounts and transfers. Zcash, by
contrast, enables shielded transactions in which the sender, recipient and
amount are not publicly disclosed, while compliance with the network’s rules
remains verifiable. The protocol also supports transparent addresses, whose data
remain accessible on the ledger. The coexistence of these two modes makes it
possible to adopt different levels of privacy, ranging from the protection of
individual information to the reporting requirements of intermediaries.</p> <p>The renewed interest in Zcash reflects the greater value attributed to privacy
in a financial system where data analysis and transaction tracking are
increasingly pervasive. ZEC is therefore being assessed not only as a
crypto-asset with a limited supply, but also as exposure to an infrastructure in
which the protection of transactional information is a native feature. The
increase in price nevertheless remains a market signal, not a measure of actual
network use. It does not demonstrate that demand for shielded transactions has
already become established on a large scale; it shows that investors have once
again begun to assign economic relevance to a segment that had long remained on
the margins of the main investment trends.</p> <h2>Orchard and the risk to supply integrity</h2> <p>On 29 May, Shielded Labs identified a vulnerability in the Orchard circuit,
which was disclosed in early June. The flaw could have allowed new units of ZEC
to be created improperly within the shielded pool without being detectable
through observation of the blockchain alone. The developers found no evidence
that the vulnerability had been exploited, but they were also unable to rule out
its use conclusively. The uncertainty stems from the very nature of shielded
transactions: by design, the protection of amounts and links between
transactions limits the ability to reconstruct individual balances
retrospectively.</p> <p>The emergency fix introduced in June eliminated the vulnerability for new
transactions, but left unresolved the uncertainty surrounding the preceding
period. The Ironwood upgrade, activated on 28 July, therefore sealed the old
pool and established a new shielded pool. Funds held in Orchard can leave it
only up to an aggregate limit equal to the total value that had entered it. The
rule does not certify that the vulnerability was never exploited, nor does it
make it possible to distinguish legitimate units from any irregular ones. It
does, however, set a ceiling on the resources that can be transferred out of the
old pool and prevents a past anomaly from producing an unlimited dilution of the
supply usable elsewhere on the network. Ironwood therefore does not eliminate
historical uncertainty, but it limits its potential effects.</p> <h2>From trust to verification</h2> <p>With Ironwood, the response to the security issue took on a more structural
form. The new Orchard circuit underwent formal verification of balance
integrity, in addition to independent reviews and further research. These
different safeguards are not interchangeable: reviews examine the code for
errors, while formal verification establishes, within explicit assumptions, that
the circuit satisfies a precisely defined property. In the case of Zcash, the
relevant property is the conservation of the monetary balance: a transaction
deemed valid must not be capable of creating ZEC in excess of the protocol’s
rules.</p> <p>The value of the upgrade therefore lies less in the promise of absolute
security, which no system can provide, and more in the shift from a reputational
safeguard to a verifiable one. Supply integrity no longer rests solely on an
ex-post assessment by the developers, but on a property embedded in the protocol
and independently verifiable by the nodes. For a crypto-asset whose economic
value depends on scarcity, this reduction in the discretionary trust required of
users is Ironwood’s most significant contribution.</p> <h2>The ETF and regulated access to ZEC</h2> <p>A decisive step in integrating ZEC into traditional finance took place on 25
August, when Grayscale converted the Zcash Trust into the ZCSH ETF, which was
admitted to trading on NYSE Arca. The vehicle allows banks, asset managers and
retail investors to gain exposure to the asset through a listed security,
without holding it directly or having to manage its custody. When new shares are
created through cash contributions, the capital raised is used by the fund to
purchase ZEC.</p> <p>The significance of the transaction is not limited to the capital channeled
through the fund. The ETF separates economic exposure to ZEC from the
operational use of the network and allows the asset to be included in
portfolios, mandates and instruments structured according to established
procedures. The economic value of a privacy-based infrastructure can thus be
incorporated into investment processes without directly using shielded
transactions. Zcash’s inclusion in the market for listed instruments therefore
makes the financial relevance of privacy-focused crypto-assets observable
through prices, trading volumes and capital flows.</p> <h2>Leverage as an amplifier of the rally</h2> <p>The perpetual futures market helps explain the speed of the rally. Between early
July and the first days of September, open interest rose from approximately $700
million to $2.4 billion. During the most intense phase of the move, daily
futures volumes exceeded $9.5 billion, compared with approximately $1 billion
traded on the ZEC spot market. This comparison does not establish the net
direction of positions, but it does highlight the role that derivatives assumed
in price formation.</p> <p>Futures allow market participants to take positions with a notional value
greater than the capital actually committed. Leverage consequently increases the
market’s sensitivity to new flows, amplifying their effects in both rising and
falling markets. It is not the source of the renewed interest in ZEC, but it
accelerates its transmission into the market price. The improved perception of
risk and greater attention to the asset therefore translated into a faster and
more pronounced price move.</p> <h2>The constraints imposed by Europe</h2> <p>The comparison between the United States and Europe highlights an asymmetry
concerning both the treatment of privacy and the availability of regulated
channels for accessing crypto-assets. In the United States, the ZCSH ETF allows
banks, asset managers and investors to gain economic exposure to ZEC through a
listed and regulated instrument, without directly holding the underlying asset.
In Europe, there is no equivalent route through a UCITS ETF with direct exposure
to ZEC: the UCITS framework does not expressly include crypto-assets among
eligible direct investments, and their potential eligibility requires a
case-by-case assessment. From July 2027, this constraint will be compounded by
the Anti-Money Laundering Regulation, which will restrict the ability of
crypto-asset service providers to offer instruments that enable anonymity or
greater obfuscation of transactions, even where privacy features are optional.</p> <p>The combined effect of these constraints may not be a contraction in European
demand for ZEC, but rather its partial migration toward foreign or unregulated
platforms with less robust safeguards for custody, investor protection and
anti-money laundering. This would produce a paradoxical outcome: rules intended
to strengthen investor protection could ultimately weaken it, while the
development of privacy-related financial infrastructure would become
concentrated in other markets.</p> <h2>Conclusions</h2> <p>The Zcash case shows that, for a public blockchain, credibility does not derive
from the absence of incidents, but from the ability to contain their economic
effects and make those effects verifiable. The Orchard vulnerability struck at
the network’s most sensitive point: not an ancillary function, but the integrity
of its supply. Ironwood did not remove uncertainty about the past; it did,
however, limit its consequences by preventing unlimited dilution and
strengthening the guarantees surrounding new transactions. This technical
restoration was accompanied by the regulated channel provided by the ETF and the
expansion of derivatives, which together helped translate the recovery in
credibility into financial demand and a higher market price.</p> <p>The most significant development, however, is the reversal of expectations.
After a 40% collapse, when many market participants regarded the investment case
as compromised, ZEC did more than recover its losses: it began to rally before
bitcoin accelerated and once again exceeded $1,000. This timing does not
demonstrate that demand has become structural, nor does it diminish the risks
associated with volatility, but it rules out interpreting the rally as a mere
reflection of the broader crypto-asset cycle. The decisive test will be whether
the current attention can be converted into lasting demand while preserving
supply integrity, liquidity across regulated channels and a privacy function
compatible with more stringent controls.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Proof of work and proof of stake: consensus, incentives and security]]></title>
            <description><![CDATA[<img src="https://www.dgi.io/news-topics/share/bitcoin.jpg"> Bitcoin · Proof of work and proof of stake secure a distributed ledger through different resources: physical computing power versus capital locked at risk.]]></description>
            <link>https://www.dgi.io/2026-09-08-proof-of-work-proof-of-stake/</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dgi.io/2026-09-08-proof-of-work-proof-of-stake/</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Staff]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 08 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <enclosure url="https://www.dgi.io/news-topics/share/bitcoin.jpg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Proof of work and proof of stake are the two main mechanisms through which a
public blockchain reaches consensus without entrusting its transaction ledger to
a central authority. Both must enable independent participants to agree on a
single history of transactions and make attempts to alter it economically
unattractive; however, they differ in the resource placed at the center of this
guarantee. In proof of work, security depends on the computing power, hardware
and energy used to produce blocks; in proof of stake, it depends on the capital
locked by validators and on the ability to penalize it when protocol rules are
violated. This distinction affects energy consumption, the cost of an attack,
the way transactions achieve finality and the forms of concentration that may
develop within the network.</p> <h2><strong>The problem a consensus mechanism must solve</strong></h2> <p>In a public blockchain, each node independently verifies that a transaction
complies with the rules set out by the protocol, from the validity of its
signature and the availability of funds to, in programmable networks, the
correct execution of smart contracts. Consensus does not therefore make an
otherwise invalid transaction valid; rather, it determines which sequence of
valid blocks should be recognized as canonical, preventing competing histories
from coexisting indefinitely. The issue is not merely preventing double
spending, but ensuring that the network can continue producing blocks even in
the presence of inactive, malfunctioning or malicious nodes, without granting a
single participant the power to determine the state of the ledger unilaterally.</p> <p>To achieve this objective, the protocol must make an attempt to construct an
alternative history sufficiently costly, so that the potential benefit of an
attack is lower than the resources required to carry it out. In this sense, a
consensus mechanism is also a system of incentives: it rewards those who
contribute appropriately to the security of the network and makes conduct
intended to alter it either penalizing or, at the very least, inefficient. Proof
of work and proof of stake share this underlying logic, but apply it to two
different resources and therefore introduce distinct economic and operational
dependencies.</p> <h2><strong>Proof of work and security based on physical resources</strong></h2> <p>In proof of work, miners collect valid transactions into a candidate block and
compete to find a hash that meets a threshold set by the protocol. Since there
is no mathematical shortcut to obtain the result, they must proceed through
repeated attempts, deploying computing power until a valid solution is found.
The chain recognized by the network is the one on which the greatest amount of
computational work has been accumulated, while the probability of creating the
next block depends on the share of hashrate controlled by the miner. The
difficulty of the task is generally adjusted by the protocol to keep block
production relatively stable, even when the computing power available to the
network changes over time.</p> <p>Security therefore derives from physical resources external to the blockchain.
An attacker would need sufficient hardware, energy and infrastructure to compete
with the rest of the network and sustain that capacity for an adequate period,
while dealing with industrial constraints such as the availability of machines,
the location of facilities and the cost of energy procurement. Block rewards and
transaction fees compensate this activity and, in substance, represent the
budget the network devotes to its security. Bitcoin is the best-known example of
this architecture, in which transaction finality is progressive: each block
added to the chain makes it more costly and less likely that part of the already
established history can be reorganized, without making such an operation
formally impossible.</p> <h2><strong>Proof of stake and security based on capital</strong></h2> <p>In proof of stake, the right to participate in consensus depends on the amount
of crypto-assets that participants lock up as collateral. Validators are
selected to propose blocks and attest to those produced by others, according to
rules that vary across blockchains but generally assign greater weight to those
exposing a larger amount of capital through staking. The premise is that a
validator has a direct interest in preserving the sound operation of the
network, since the economic value of the locked capital depends on trust in the
protocol itself; security is therefore linked not to the use of an external
physical resource, but to the availability of a share of the asset that the
network uses and protects.</p> <p>In many proof-of-stake models, a validator that breaches specific consensus
rules may be subject to slashing, namely a reduction in the capital placed in
staking. The difference from proof of work is substantial: the energy used by a
miner is a cost that has already been incurred, whereas a validator’s capital
may remain exposed to economic consequences even after an attempt to alter
consensus. Locked capital also entails an opportunity cost, market risk and, in
some protocols, technical delays in entering and leaving validation; these
elements limit how quickly a material share of the network can be activated or
withdrawn. There is, however, no single proof-of-stake model: the selection
procedures, voting thresholds, participation requirements and penalties adopted
by Ethereum, Cardano and Solana differ materially and cannot be reduced to a
single framework.</p> <h2><strong>Energy and the cost of an attack</strong></h2> <p>In proof of work, energy consumption is not a side effect of validation, but a
structural component of security. Competition to produce blocks requires
continuous spending on hardware and electricity, making an attack dependent on
access to industrial and operational resources external to the network. Hardware
may retain residual value or be redeployed for other purposes, whereas energy
already consumed is an unrecoverable cost; the security of the system therefore
depends on the ability of rewards to continue supporting a sufficiently broad
and competitive base of miners.</p> <p>Proof of stake does not require continuous competition to calculate hashes.
Validators must keep nodes available, protect cryptographic keys and ensure
operational continuity, but the network’s electricity consumption does not
increase in proportion to the capital locked in staking. The cost of an attack
depends instead on the value of the asset, market liquidity, the rules governing
entry to and exit from staking, and the presence of intermediaries that collect
delegated capital. This structure makes it possible to penalize certain forms of
misconduct directly, but it also ties the network’s economic protection to the
market value of the asset used as collateral. It is therefore not appropriate to
compare the cost of hardware mechanically with the value of crypto-assets in
staking: the two models make attacks costly through different resources, subject
to economic dynamics that are not directly comparable.</p> <h2><strong>Finality and the response to a consensus crisis</strong></h2> <p>Proof of work achieves progressive finality. A transaction becomes more
difficult to reorganize as new blocks are added to the chain, but the network
does not establish a point beyond which a modification becomes technically
impossible. This requires operators to determine the appropriate number of
confirmations based on the value transferred, the criticality of the service and
the level of risk they are willing to accept, an assessment that is particularly
relevant for applications settling payments, trades or large-scale transfers of
value.</p> <p>Many proof-of-stake protocols instead adopt explicit finality, achieved when a
qualified majority of validators attests to the same state of the network. This
does not rule out the possibility of consensus crises, but changes the way they
are managed, since an attempt to violate finality may expose the participants
involved to material economic losses and require the community to coordinate
around a shared resolution. Some proof-of-stake architectures also require a
node that connects after a very long absence to obtain a recent and verifiable
reference point in order to identify the canonical chain, a property known as
weak subjectivity. The soundness of the model therefore depends not only on the
rules established by the protocol, but also on the distribution of validators,
the diversity of the software in use and the network’s ability to respond to
persistently hostile behavior.</p> <h2><strong>Concentration, censorship and operational dependencies</strong></h2> <p>Neither model automatically guarantees a high degree of decentralization. In
proof of work, concentration may develop around mining pools, specialized
hardware manufacturers, large industrial operators and geographic areas with
cheaper energy or more favorable infrastructure. Individual miners can
generally redirect their hashrate to a different pool, but remain constrained by
the physical location of their machines, energy costs and the availability of
suppliers capable of producing competitive equipment. The distribution of
hashrate must therefore be assessed alongside the concentration of the
infrastructure that makes it possible.</p> <p>In proof of stake, the main forms of concentration concern exchanges, staking
operators and liquid staking protocols, to which many users delegate their
participation in consensus. Proper analysis requires distinguishing between
ownership of capital, key management, node operations and governance power,
rather than automatically equating the share attributed to a service with direct
control over the network. Nonetheless, large, identifiable operators located in
specific jurisdictions may become pressure points for transaction selection,
operational continuity or the application of regulatory obligations. Proof of
work is also exposed to censorship risks, but these tend to be concentrated
around pools and mining infrastructure rather than among the managers of
delegated capital.</p> <h2><strong>Conclusions</strong></h2> <p>Proof of work and proof of stake are not two versions of the same model, one
simply more efficient than the other, but two security architectures built on
different assumptions. Proof of work ties the protection of the network to
physical resources external to the blockchain, sustaining a continuous energy
cost and making consensus dependent on the availability of mining
infrastructure; proof of stake instead links it to capital internal to the
system, which can be locked and penalized, but whose value depends on trust in
the network that the capital itself helps to protect.</p> <p>Assessing a blockchain therefore requires considering the cost of an attack, the
distribution of consensus power, the structure of incentives, infrastructure
resilience and the ability to resist censorship and concentration together.
Energy consumption remains an important dimension, but it cannot be treated as
the sole criterion: the comparison between proof of work and proof of stake is
ultimately about how a public network chooses to acquire, distribute and
preserve its security.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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